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THE GROWTH OF VANCOUVER AS AN INNOVATION
HUB: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
CAMDEN HUTCHISON t & LI-WEN LINt

I.

INTRODUCTION
Vancouver, British Columbia-known for its temperate climate,
mountainous scenery, and progressive urban politics-has emerged in
recent decades as a dynamic entrepreneurial hub. Dubbed "Silicon Valley
North" 'Vancouver ranks highly in international startup rankings2 and was

recently selected by the federal government as one of five "innovation
superclusters".

Members of the local startup community describe

Assistant Professor, Peter A Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.
Associate Professor, Peter A Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.
The authors would like to thank Ryan Black, Brian Cheffins, and Sancho McCann for
helpful feedback on an earlier draft. We would also like to thank the anonymous journal
referees who provided useful comments and suggestions. Finally, we would like to thank
Elizabeth Keyes for excellent research assistance.
See e.g. Tamsyn Burgmann, "How Vancouver is Becoming Silicon Valley North", The

2

Globe and Mail (10 August 2014) S1. Vancouver competes for the title of "Silicon
Valley North" with Ottawa, Toronto, and the country of Canada itself. In the Vancouver
context, "Silicon Valley North" plays on "Hollywood North"-a common term for
Vancouver's film and television industry.
See e.g. StartupBlink Startup Ecosystem Rankings Report (StartupBlink, 2020); Global
Startup Ecosystem Report (Startup Genome, 2020).

3

The Innovation Superclusters Initiative is a funding partnership between the federal
government and private industry pursuant to which five regions have been selected for
the development of industry-specific business and technology networks. Vancouver was
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Vancouver as "a vibrant early-stage ecosystem",' "a super exciting market, a
super exciting opportunityl"5 and "one of the fastest growing tech
ecosystems in the world" 6-an

image projected by local companies to

attract talent and investment capital. By all accounts, Vancouver would
appear to be one of the most entrepreneurial cities in North America.

The reality is more complicated, however. Although Vancouver
performs well compared to other Canadian cities, it lags many US cities in
terms of number of startups, amount of venture capital, and creation of
intellectual property. Unsurprisingly, the number of startups in Vancouver
pales in comparison to Silicon Valley, the world's leading entrepreneurial
hub. Even when adjusted for population, however, Vancouver also trails its
southern neighbor Seattle, as well as secondary US tech hubs such as
Denver, Austin, and Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill. Like many Canadian

cities, Vancouver struggles with "scaling" startups into large, profitable
companies, which is an important driver of economic growth.7 Given
Vancouver's many advantages (including its desirable locale, open culture,
and strong research universities), the city may be failing to realize its full
potential.

selected as the Digital Technology Supercluster. See "Digital Technology Supercluster"
online: Canada'sDigital Technology Supercluster <www.digitalsupercluster.ca/>.

4

See Kate Wilson, "Vancouver's Diverse Tech Portfolio Fueling Ecosystem's Growth" (9
August

2018),

online:

BetaKit

<betakit.com/vancouvers-diverse

-tech-portfolio-fuelling-ecosystems-growth/>.

5

See Kate Wilson, "Why so Many Silicon Valley Companies are Moving to Vancouver"

(2

July

2019),

online:

The

Georgia

Straight

<straight.com/tech/

1261681 /why-so-many-silicon-valley-companies-are-moving-vancouver>.
6

Raghwa Gopal, "Five BC Tech Startups that are Ready to Change the World", online:
Daily Hive Venture Vancouver <dailyhive.com/vancouver/be-tech-startups-growing>.

See e.g. Statistics Canada, The Distributionof Employment Growth Rates in Canada:
The Role ofHigh-Growth and Rapidly ShrinkingFirms, by Jay Dixon & Rollin AnneMarie, in Economic Analysis Research Paper Series, Catalogue No 11 F0027M, no 91
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, May 2014); Magnus Henrekson & Dan Johansson,
"Gazelles as Job Creators: A Survey and Interpretation of the Evidence" (2010) 35:2
Small Bus Econ 227; Pierre Lortie, EntrepreneurialFinanceand Economic Growth:A
CanadianOverview (Toronto: CD Howe Institute, 2019) at 24-26.
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This article examines legal explanations for Vancouver's entrepreneurial
performance. There is a broad literature within the fields oflaw, economics,
sociology, and history connecting legal institutions to innovation and
entrepreneurship. Many scholars have emphasized law's importance to the
formation and growth of innovative firms. Beginning with the work of

James Willard Hurst,' scholars have viewed legal structures as facilitative
(or inhibitive) of risk taking, investment, and technological innovation.
Recent scholars including Douglas Cumming,9 Michael Ewens and Joan
Farre-Mensa, 0 Ronald Gilson," Josh Lerner," Jeffrey MacIntosh," J Ari

8

James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century
United States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956); James Willard Hurst,
Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin,
1836-1915 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). Hurst's thesis was that

19th century American law channeled and released the productive energies of the
American population.
v

See e.g. John Armour & Douglas J Cumming, "The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley"

(2006) 58:4 Oxford Econ Papers 596 [Armour & Cumming, "The Legislative Road"];
Douglas J Cumming, "Measuring the Effect of Bankruptcy Laws on Entrepreneurship
Across Countries" (2012) 16:1 J Entrepreneurial Fin 80; Douglas J Cumming & Dan
Li, "Public Policy, Entrepreneurship, and Venture Capital in the United States" (2013)

23 J Corp Fin 345.
10

See e.g. Michael Ewens &Joan Farre-Mensa, "The Deregulation of the Private Equity

Markets and the Decline in IPOs" (2020) 33:12 Rev Fin Stud 5463.
"

See e.g. Ronald J Gilson, "The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete" (1999) 74:3
NYU L Rev 575 [Gilson, "The Legal Infrastructure"].

12

See e.g. Paul Gompers &Josh Lerner, "The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Partnership Agreements" (1996) 39:2

J

Law Econ 463; Josh Lerner, "The

Future of Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital" (2010) 35:3

Small Bus Econ 255; Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, InternationalDifferences in
Entrepreneurship(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010);Josh Lerner & Joacim
Tag, "Institutions and Venture Capital" (2013) 22:1 Indus Corp Change 153.
13

See e.g. Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "Tantalus Unbound: Government Policy and Innovation
in Canada" (2012) 5:8 The School of Public Policy Publications, University of Calgary
1.
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Pandes,"4 and many others have explored relationships between specific
areas of law and the prevalence and success of entrepreneurship. According
to these authors, laws regarding taxation, labour, insolvency, corporate
finance,

and

immigration

can

have

a

significant

impact

on

entrepreneurship, both within and across jurisdictions. The implication of

this research is that jurisdictions can promote entrepreneurship by enacting
more efficient laws.
This article contributes to the literature on law and entrepreneurship by
comparing Vancouver to analogous regions in the United States-most

notably Silicon Valley. We focus on Vancouver due to its similarities with
northern California in terms of geography," political culture, 6 and
financial/institutional history. 7 As the laws that affect Vancouver startups
are both federal and provincial, our analysis focuses primarily on federal and
British Columbia law. Our results are not limited to Vancouver however:
given the substantial homogeneity of Canadian provincial law," our
findings have implications for the entire country of Canada.
Our comparison reveals that legal differences between Canada and the
United States cannot explain differences in startup activity. 9 Not only are

"

See e.g. J Ari Pandes, Michael J Robinson & Bryce C Tingle, "The IPO Market in
Canada: What a Comparison with the United States Tells Us About a Global Problem"
(2013) 54:3 Can Bus LJ 321; J Ari Pandes & Michael Robinson, "Is Effective Junior
Equity Market Regulation Possible?" (2014) 70:4 Fin Analysts J 42.

"

Vancouver is the westernmost of Canada's major cities, with a mild Pacific climate. It
shares the same time zone with California, an important factor for business and
investment connections.

1

Vancouver is often regarded-accurately or not-as one of Canada's most progressive
cities.

"

Similar to San Francisco, Vancouver lies distant from the traditional financial centers of
eastern Canada. Much of the personal wealth in Vancouver is held in the form of real
estate.

"

See e.g. Camden Hutchison, "Pluralism and Convergence: Judicial Standardization in
Canadian Corporate Law" (2021) 58:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 163. Note that Quebec, a civil
law jurisdiction, is a (partial) exception.

9

Although our analysis of provincial law focuses on British Columbia, the legal
environment in Canada is similar across the provinces. Much of our analysis applies

2021
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the two countries' laws similar, the differences that exist are not consistently
in the US's favor. We therefore offer an alternative explanation for
disparities in startup activity: Rather than differences in law, the variance in

entrepreneurship between Canada and the United States is due to broader
institutional factors, including underdeveloped business networks, alack of

Canadian venture capital, and "brain drain" to the United States. Although
certain of these challenges are amenable to policy reform, others are an
inevitable result of the size of the US economy. Given this economic reality,
the best strategy for strengthening the Vancouver startup economy may be
greater integration with the United States.

This article is organized as follows. Part II presents statistical data on the
Vancouver startup economy. These data show that while Vancouver
produces more startups and receives more venture capital investment per

capita than other Canadian cities, it underperforms many US cities on
equivalent metrics. Part III compares Canadian and US law in the areas of
tax, securities, corporate law, labour, bankruptcy/insolvency, trade policy,
and immigration. We argue that, taken as a whole, none of these areas
explain Vancouver's weaker economic performance. Part IV suggests
alternative institutional explanations. Part V concludes by summarizing our
findings and presenting specific policy recommendations.

DATA ON THE VANCOUVER STARTUP ENVIRONMENT

II.

The best means of comparing startup regions is by analyzing empirical data.
In this Part II, we use original data to compare Vancouver to other major
tech hubs-including US regions such as Silicon Valley and Canadian cities
such as Toronto and Montreal"-in terms of startups, venture capital, and
technological innovation. For the majority of our analysis, we use business

equally to Ontario, for example (though perhaps less so to Quebec, a civil law
jurisdiction).
20

Unless otherwise noted, our analysis is based on metropolitan area rather than
municipality. Thus, "Silicon Valley" includes the entire San Francisco-San Jose valley,
while "Vancouver" includes the entire lower mainland of British Columbia.
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and financial data collected from Crunchbase, a widely used commercial
data source.
A.

Other data sources are specifically cited when used.

STARTUPS AND VENTURE CAPITAL

Figure 1 shows that over the last decade, more than 2,000 startup
companies were founded in Vancouver-more than Montreal, but fewer

than Toronto.2 Although Vancouver trails Toronto in total number of
startups, it exceeds Toronto on a population basis. Figure 2 shows that
Vancouver has an annual average of 8.46 startups per 100,000 residents,
while Toronto has had only 7.75 startups per 100,000 residents.

21

Crunchbase is a leading source ofventure capital and private equity data. According to
our research, at least 251 academic journal articles, 921 magazine articles, and 188

industry reports have used Crunchbase data. In Crunchbase's "Companies" database, we
filtered on "Founded Date" and "Headquarters Location" to identify companies
established during the period of 2010-2019 in each metropolitan region. In

Crunchbase's "Funding Rounds" database, we filtered on "Organization Location,'
"Founded Date," and "AnnouncedDate" to collect funding data. The definition of each
funding type (e.g., "venture capital") can be found at Crunchbase Product Team
"Glossary of Funding Types" (last updated 23 May 2021), online: Crunchbase

<support.crunchbase.com/hc/en-us/
articles/1 15010458467-Glossary-of-Funding-Types>.
22

Our startup figures are necessarily estimates, as we cannot be certain that Crunchbase
includes all startup companies.
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Figure 1: Total Number of Startups (est.), 2010-2019
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Figure 2: Average Annual Number of Startups Per 100,000 Residents
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In addition to number of startups, the amount of venture capital
investment is another important indicator. Figure 3 shows that from 2010
to 2019, over US$3.7 billion of venture capital was invested in Vancouver.
Again, while this is less than Toronto, Vancouver comes out ahead on a
population basis. Figure 4 shows that Vancouver has seen an annual average
of US$150.60 in venture capital investment per capita, the most of any
major city in Canada.23

Figure 3: Total Venture Capital Investment, 2010-2019 (billion US$)
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The Canadian city with the greatest amount ofventure capital investment per capita is

Waterloo. However, Waterloo is significantly smaller than the other cities in our figures.

VANCOUVER AS AN INNOVATION HUB

2021

701

Figure 4: Average Annual Venture Capital Investment Per Capita,

2010-2019 (US$)
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Vancouver's record is less impressive compared to cities in the United
States. Figure 5 shows that Vancouver's startup creation rate is only 30%
Silicon Valley's. This is not necessarily surprising, as Silicon Valley is by far

the world's leading startup region. As Figure 5 also shows, however,
Vancouver has a lower rate than several US cities. The gap is even wider
with respect to venture capital investment. Figure 6 shows that Vancouver's
venture capital investment per capita (US$150.60) is only 39% of Denver's

(US$383), 30% of Seattle's (US$494), 25% ofAustin's (US$607), and 4%
of Silicon Valley's (US$3,743).
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Figure 5: Average Annual Number of Startups Per 100,000 Residents

(est.), 2010-2019
30
25
20
15
10

5

0

0

Figure 6: Average Annual Venture Capital Investment Per Capita,

2010-2019 (US$)

4,000

3,500
3,000
2,500

2,000

1,500
1,000
500
0

"

t

9

Q 9I
9O

2021

B.

VANCOUVER AS AN INNOVATION HUB

703

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Although the number of startups in a given city is an important indicator, it
does not necessarily measure entrepreneurial success. In order to contribute
to long-term economic growth, startups must "scale" into growing,
sustainable businesses. Unfortunately, Vancouver faces challenges in scaling

up small tech companies, a problem shared with other Canadian cities. To
date, Vancouver has only produced three home-grown "unicorns" (i.e.,
privately held companies with a valuation of at least one billion dollars), an
increasingly common indicator of entrepreneurial success.2Interestingly, a
very high percentage of Vancouver startups go public,

2'

another common

Trulioo was recently valued at $2.1 billion, Clio has been valued at $1.6 billion, and
GeoComply is rumored to be valued at more than $1 billion. Mary Ann Azevedo,
"Canada's Newest Unicorn: Clio Raises $110M at a $1.6B Valuation for Legal Tech",

(27 April2021), online: Tech Crunch <https://techcrunch.com/2021/04/27/canadasnewest-unicorn-clio-raises-110m-at-a-1-6b-valuation-for-legal-tech/>;
William
Johnson, "Vancouver has Produced Seven Unicorn Companies in the Past Seven
Months",

(7

June

2021),

online:

Vancouver

Tech Journal <www.vantech

journal.com/p/vancouver-unicorns>. Several other companies have been (mis)reported

as unicorns or relocated to the United States before reaching scale. Hootsuite Inc, a
Vancouver-based social media startup, was reported as having avaluation of one billion
dollars following a 2014 funding round. However, its valuation was later revealed to be
only $750 million. See Gerrit de Vynck, "Hootsuite Never Really Was a Canadian
Unicorn After All, The Globe andMail(28 February 2017). Kabam Games, Inc, a San

Francisco- and Vancouver-based social game developer, was reported as having a
valuation of over one billion dollars in 2014, but it was recently purchased by Netmarble
Corp for only $800 million. See Connie Loizos, "Gaming Company Kabam's Roller
Coaster Ride to an $800 Million Exit" (28 February 2017), online: TechCrunch
8

<social.techcrunch.com/2017/02/2 /gaming-compa
ny-kabans-roller-coaster-ride-to-a-700-million-exit/>.

Slack Technologies, Inc was

founded in Vancouver in 2009, but relocated to San Francisco following a series of US
venture capital investments. After moving to the United States, Slack Technologies, Inc

went public in 2019 at avaluation ofmore than $20 billion. See Seth Fiegerman, "Slack
is Now Worth More than $20 Billion" (21 June 2019), online: CNN
<cnn.com/2019/06/20/tech/
slack-wall-street-debut/index.html>.
25

To "go public" means to register on apublic securities exchange, typically in connection

with an initial public offering. In the United States, going public is considered the most
significant and climactic stage in a startup company's growth cycle.
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(IPOs) with

sustainable economic growth would be misleading, however. Our analysis
shows that the Vancouver economy is characterized by premature, low-value
IPOs, presumably due to a lack of professional venture capital.
Vancouver startups go public at a much higher rate than startup
companies in peer cities. Figure 7 shows that 9.64% of Vancouver startups
founded between 2010 and 2019 have gone public, compared to only

2.69% for Toronto and 1.53% for Montreal. This rate is even more striking
when compared to US cities. Only 0.3%-0.5% of startups founded in

Silicon Valley, Seattle, or Austin from 2010 to 2019 have gone public.
Figure 7: Percentage of Startups Founded 2010-2019 that Subsequently

Went Public

12%

8%
10%

In addition to going public more often, Vancouver startups go public
early in their growth cycles and at low valuations. On average, Vancouver
startups that ultimately go public do so only two years after their founding.
This is half the time of Silicon Valley, where the regional average is four
years. Nearly 70% of Vancouver companies that undergo IPOs have annual
revenues of less than $1 million, and more than 90% have 50 or fewer
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employees. It is important to note that many of these startups are in the
mining industry, which accounts for 34% of Vancouver IPOs.` Even with
mining startups excluded, however, Vancouver's IPO rate (approximately
six percent) is still more than twice Toronto's and more than twenty times
Silicon Valley's. As shown in Table 1, most of Vancouver's public companies
are listed on the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V), a secondary "junior"
market for public venture finance. The TSX-V is a direct descendant of the
Vancouver Stock Exchange, a global center of "penny stock" investing in the

1980s and 1990s."
Table 1: Number (Percentage) of Vancouver Startup Listings by Stock

Exchange 2010-2019
Stock Exchange

Number (Percentage) of
Vancouver Startup Listings

26

TSX-V

116 (59.2%)

Canadian Securities Exchange

44 (22.4%)

OTC

16 (8.1%)

Toronto Stock Exchange

11(5.6%)

Frankfurt Stock Exchange

2(1%)

NASDAQ

2(1%)

Tallinn Stock Exchange

2 (1%)

London Stock Exchange

1 (0.5%)

We struggled with whether to include mining companies in our analysis. British
Columbia's extractive industries are distinct from its "technology" industry, but many
mining startups themselves employ innovative technologies. Ultimately, we were unable
to develop any principled method for discriminating between "technology" and "nontechnology" startups, and could only identify mining companies as a group (using

industry information provided by Crunchbase). Thus, unless otherwise noted, our
statistics include mining startups.
2

In 1999, the Vancouver Stock Exchange merged with the Alberta Stock Exchange to
form the Canadian Venture Exchange, which was later purchased by TMX Group
Limited and became the TSX-V. The former Vancouver Stock Exchange was notorious
for highly speculative-if not outright fraudulent-securities promotions.
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Number (Percentage) of
Vancouver Startup Listings

New York Stock Exchange

1 (0.5%)

Tirana Stock Exchange

1 (0.5%)

Total

196 (100%)

Given their small size, many Vancouver startups need additional growth
capital following their IPO. As shown in Figure 8, Vancouver has the
highest percentage of post-IPO financing as a percentage of total
fundraising. 28 From 2010 to 2019, post-IPO financing made up 38.9% of
total startup funding in Vancouver. Again, a significant portion of this
financing was raised by mining companies.29 Mining startups accounted for
26.4% of post-IPO financing transactions and 43.5% of funds raised.
According to Crunchbase, mining startups often raise additional financing
from large "senior" mining corporations following an IPO, whereas tech
startups receive post-IPO financing from private equity and/or venture
capital firms. In Silicon Valley, post-IPO financing was only 11.8% of all
startup financing, though the average deal size was approximately 10 times
that of Vancouver.31

28

According to Crunchbase's data categorization, "post-IPO financing" means private
capital raised after an IPO.

2)

Interestingly, mining companies also account for a significant portion of post-IPO
financing in Toronto.
According to our data, the average deal size for post-IPO financing was US$18.7
million in Vancouver and US$189 million in Silicon Valley.

2021

VANCOUVER AS AN INNOVATION HUB

707

Figure 8: Post-IPO Financing as Percentage of Total Financing, 2010-

2019
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PROFILE OF INVESTORS

Many of the most active investors in Vancouver are from outside British
Columbia. Table 2 shows the top 10 investors by number of deals from
2010 to 2019. Notably, BDC Capital (and affiliates), a Montreal-based
development bank owned by the federal government, made more
investments than any other investor.31 Given that BDC Capital is a
government entity with a legislative mandate to invest in Canadian
companies, this is not a particularly positive sign for the Vancouver
investment market. Vancouver's private venture capital firms are relatively
small, with a limited history of investments and exits.32 As measured by size
of investments (rather than number), US venture capital firms are the
leading investors in Vancouver. As shown in Table 3, the largest venture
capital investments are dominated by American investors.

31

BDC Capital and its affiliates made 87 investments, followed by Yaletown Partners with
33 investments.

32

According to Crunchbase, 81 venture capital firms are based in Vancouver, with a total

of853 investments and 190 exits to date. GrowthWorks Capital is the most active, with
a total of 125 investments and 37 exits. The median founding year ofVancouver-based
venture capital firms is 2009, illustrating the youth of the local industry.
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Table 2: Top 10 Investors by Number of Deals in Vancouver, 2010-2019
Rank

Investor

Headquarters

Type

Number of
Deals

1

BDC Capital (and
affiliates)

Montreal, QC,
Canada

Public Entity

87

2

Yaletown Partners

Vancouver, BC,

Venture Capital

33

3

HIGHLINEvc

Canada
Toronto, ON,
Canada

Venture Capital
Accelerator

31

4

Techstars

Boulder, CO,

Venture Capital

26

United States

Accelerator

5
6

Creative Destruction

Toronto, ON,

University

Lab

Canada

Accelerator

23

GrowthWorks Capital

Vancouver, BC,

Venture Capital

21

Canada
7

Chrysalix Venture

Vancouver, BC,

Venture Capital

20

8

Capital
VA Angels

Canada
Calgary, AB,
Canada

Angel Group

17

9

Rhino Ventures

Vancouver, BC,

Venture Capital

14

Venture Capital

13

Public Entity

13

Canada
10 (tied)

Pallasite Ventures

Chicago, IL,
United States

10 (tied)

Sustainable
Development

Ottawa, ON,
Canada

Technology Canada

Table 3: Top 10 Venture Capital Deals in Vancouver 2010-2019
Name

Funding

Money

Type

Year

Industry

2019

Legal

JMI Equity, TCV
Accel,
Insight Partners,

Clio

Series D

Raised
(US$)
250,000,000

Hootsuite

Series B

165,000,000

2013

Advertising /
Social Media

JDS Silver

unknown

65,000,000

2016

Energy /

Investors

(US firms in bold)

OMERS Ventures
series

Mining

Denham Capital

2021

Name

Zymeworks
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Funding

Money

Type

Raised
(US$)
61,500,000

Series A

Year

Industry

709

Investors

(US firms in bold)
2016

Biotech

BDC Healthcare
Venture,

Brace Pharma,
Celgene, CTI Life
Sciences Fund, Eli

Lilly, Fonds de
solidaritd FTQ
Lumira Ventures,

Merlin Nexus,
Northleaf Capital
Partners, Teralys

Hootsuite

Series D

60,000,000

2014

Advertising /
Social Media

Capital
Accel, Cloud Apps
Capital Partners,
Difference Capital,
Fidelity, Insight
Partners, OMERS
Ventures, Silicon

Sierra

Series D

59,500,000

2014

Biotech

Oncology

Valley Bank
Apjohn Ventures,
Capital Midwest
Fund, Frazier

Healthcare Partners,
Hopen Life Science

Ventures, Janus
Capital Group,

OrbiMed,
RA Capital
Management,

Amherst Fund
Trulioo

Series C

52,860,149

2019

Finance

American Express,

BDC Capital,
Blumberg Capital,
Citi Ventures,

Goldman Sachs,
Santander
InnoVentures
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Name

BuildDirect

Funding

Money

Type

Raised
(US$)
50,000,000

Series C

Year

Industry

VOL 54:3

Investors

(US firms in bold)
2014

E-Commerce

BDC Venture
Capital, BMO
Capital Markets,

Mohr Davidow
Ventures, OMERS
Ventures

SAXX

unknown

Underwear

series

Visier

Series D

50,000,000

2016

E-Commerce

Brentwood

45,000,000

2017

Human

Adams Street

Resources

Partners, BYU

Associates

Cougar Capital,
Foundation Capital,
Sorenson Capital,
Summit Partners

D.

TALENT MARKET

Another important factor for regional economic success is the development
and retention of skilled labour. Since 2014, Vancouver has produced more
than 2,000 tech graduates each year on average.33 The University of British
Columbia (UBC) is the region's leading educational institution and is
recognized internationally for its computer science and engineering
programs. 3 The talent pool created by UBC and other regional universities

is an important source of both entrepreneurs and skilled labour. Many

a

See CBRE Research, "Scoring Tech Talent" (2020) at 24, online (pdf): CBRE Group,
Inc. <cbre.vo.llnwd.net/grgservices/secure/US%202020%20Tech%20Talent%20July

.pdf?e=1622135897&h=c3f63760cd1ece9382b6126025d02807>.
4

See BC Tech Association, "TechTalentBC Report" (2016) at 19, online (pdf): BC Tech
Association
<workbc.ca/getmedia/8d38ac6f-82d4-4dbl-b0bf-ac0f77d78af5/
2016_techtalentbc_report.pdf.aspx>. This report finds that UBC produces the highest
number of tech graduates in British Columbia. The number of graduates from
bachelor's programs in computer science, engineering, and technology in 2014 was as

follows: UBC (820), British Columbia Institute of Technology (473), University of
Victoria (380), Simon Frasier University (368), University of Northern British
Columbia (43) and Thomson Rivers University (20). The total number of graduates
from all programs in 2014 was 2,263.
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UBC graduates become entrepreneurs; however, only about one-third
found their businesses in Vancouver (see Table 4). Notably, more than 21%
of UBC alumni founders start their businesses in the United States, most
often in California.35 Similarly, a high rate of University of Toronto alumni
also start businesses in the United States (more than 23%).36 These figures
speak to Canada's larger brain drain problem, discussed in Part IV.37
Table 4: UBC Alumni Founders and Startup Locations

(as of

April 2020)
Startup Location

Number of Alumni

Percentage

Canada

Founders
195

48.4%

Vancouver

138

34.2%

Toronto

22

5.5%

Other Locations in

35

8.7%

United States

85

21.1%

Asia

18

4.5%

Europe

10

2.5%

Other Locations

3

0.7%

Unknown

92

22.8%

Total

403

100%

Canada

3

Authors' estimate based on Crunchbase data. Note that 22.8% of all alumni startup
locations are not disclosed in the Crunchbase data. These undisclosed startup locations
are most likely in Canada and the United States, however (given the distribution of
known startup locations).

36

See ibid.

37

For an analysis of brain drain in the STEM sector, see Nicole Goodman, Nathan
Olmstead & Zachary Spicer, "Reversing the Brain Drain: Where is Canadian STEM

Talent

Going?"

(2018),

online

(pdf):

Delvina

<brocku.ca/

social-sciences/political-science/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 153/Reversin
g-the-Brain-Drain.pdf>

712

UBC LAW REVIEW

VOL 54:3

The labour market for tech workers in Vancouver has grown rapidly in
recent years. Indeed, among 50 North American tech hubs, Vancouver saw
the highest tech employment growth from 2014 to 2019 (47.9%
cumulatively). 38 More than 27,500 tech jobs were added during this 5-year
period, for a total of 84,900 tech positions as of 2019.39 The booming job

market has provided strong employment opportunities for Vancouver tech
graduates. Despite this growth, however, Vancouver offers lower salaries
compared to other North American tech hubs. The average salary for
Vancouver tech workers is only CA$81,913 while the average salary in
Silicon Valley is US$136,060, more than twice as much.'0 Figure 9 displays

several cities' average tech salaries as a percentage of Silicon Valley's (the
highest in North America). As Figure 9 shows, tech workers in Vancouver,
Toronto, and Montreal earn substantially less than tech workers in US
cities. Vancouver's average tech salary is only slightly more than Montreal's
(a far less expensive city) and barely half Seattle's. Even if the Canadian and
US dollars were at parity, Canadian cities would still offer lower salaries
than their US counterparts.41

"

CBRE Research, supra note 33 at 24.

9

See ibid.

'*

See ibid.

"

See ibid. CBRE Group, Inc surveyed tech wages in 50 tech hubs in North America,
including 3 in Canada and 47 in the United States. The average tech salaries in the
Canadian hubs are: Toronto (CA$84,989); Vancouver (CA$81,931); and Montreal

(CA$80,579). The mean salary ofthe 47 American tech hubs is US$95,524. Even if the
CA$/US$ exchange rate were 1:1, tech wages in the 3 Canadian hubs would be below
the 25th percentile of the US hubs. Data collected from note 33 and calculated by the
authors.
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The economic effects of these lower salaries are ambiguous. On the one

hand, lower salaries may attract tech companies to Vancouver for cheaper
labour. On the other hand, lower salaries may disadvantage Vancouver in

the international competition for talent, particularly vis-a-vis the United
States. As the authors can personally attest, Vancouver is by no means an

inexpensive city: It ranks as the world's second-least affordable housing
market42 and has a higher rent-to-tech-wage ratio than San Francisco"
E.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Canada trails many developed countries-including the United States-in
research and development (R&D) spending.44 Although assessing the direct
impact of R&D spending is difficult, one proxy measure is number of
42

See Wendell Cox & Hugh Pavletich, "16th Annual Demographia International Housing

Affordability

Survey"

(2020)

at

3,

12,

16,

online

(pdf):

Demographia

<demographia.com/dhil6-intro.pdf>.
43

CBRE Research, supra note 33 at 41.

4

As measured on a per capita basis. See "Research and Development: Gross Domestic

Spending on R&D", online: Organizationfor Economic Cooperationand Development
<data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm>.
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patents generated. The data in Figure 10 suggest that Vancouver startups
generate fewer patents than startups in other leading cities. According to
our calculations, only 6.2% of Vancouver startups hold at least one patent"
These patent-generating startups cross a wide range of industries, including
biotechnology, information technology, and advanced manufacturing,
though none are in British Columbias traditional mining industry.

Figure 10: Percentage of Startups Founded 2010-2019 with at Least
One Patent
16%
14%
12%
10%l
8%
6%
4%
2%

0%

Although patent activity is an important measure of innovation, it is difficult to choose
the most meaningful measure of patent activity itself. Many startup companies hold no
patents at all, while a small number of outlier companies hold literally thousands of
patents of questionable value. Thus, the mean number ofpatents per firm is significantly
distorted by outliers. The median number ofpatents per firm is similarly uninformative,

as the median in most regions is zero. We consider the percentage of startups with at
least one patent to be the most useful measure of innovative patent activity.
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This patenting gap is also present in regional universities: UBC trails
many US universities in both patent applications and patent licensing, as
well as number of startups formed by faculty and students.46 Although
explaining these institutional disparities is beyond the scope of this article,
they may be a result of cultural differences in how universities pursue
intellectual property. It appears that at least some US universities are more
aggressive than Canadian universities with respect to patent creation and

monetization, as seen in Table 5.
Table 5: University Patents, Licensing, and Startup Formations (2018)
Institution

Location

University of
California

CA, United
States
(multiple

Massachusetts

Boston, MA,

Institute of

United States

New Patent

Patent

Startups

Applications
Filed

Licenses
Issued

1,394

282

Formed
(faculty/
students)
91

455

124

32

440

235

35

299

143

28

250

99

21

204

75

29

campuses)

Technology

University of

TX, United

Texas

States

(multiple
campuses)

Stanford

Palo Alto /

University

Stanford, CA,
United States

Harvard

Boston, MA,

University

United States

Columbia

New York City,

University

NY, United
States

46

Startups formed by faculty and graduate students often exploit intellectual property
developed by university research. Many university patent licenses are granted to the
faculty members who conducted the research.
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Institution

Duke University

Location

Durham, NC,

VOL 54:3

New Patent

Patent

Startups

Applications

Licenses

Formed

Filed

Issued

151

103

(faculty/
students)
16

119

27

8

119

50

15

118

344

10

109

76

5

98

102

20

81

85

8

79

35

23

74

22

8

68

46

8

64

22

5

60

19

4

23

3

2

United States
Northwestern

Evanston, IL,

University

United States

University of

Los Angeles,

Southern

CA, United

California

States

University of

Seattle, WA,

Washington

United States

University of

Chapel Hill,

North Carolina

NC, United
States

North Carolina

Raleigh, NC,

State University

United States

University of

Vancouver, BC,

British Columbia

Canada

University of

Toronto, ON,

Toronto

Canada

(excluding

affiliated
hospitals)

University of

Chicago, IL,

Chicago

United States

New York

New York City,

University

NY, United
States

McGill

Montreal, QC,

University

Canada

Universitd de

Montreal, QC,

Montreal

Canada

Simon Fraser

Vancouver, BC,

University

Canada
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Institution

Location

San Diego State

San Diego,

University

CA, United

New Patent

Patent

Startups

Applications

Licenses

Formed

Filed

Issued

(faculty/
students)

16

9

1

4

0

1

0

1

0
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States
York University

Toronto, ON,

Canada
University of

Denver, CO,

Denver

United States

F.

SUMMARY

As discussed in this Part II, Vancouver performs well compared to other
Canadian cities, but lags US tech hubs in startup formation, venture capital
investment, and technological innovation. One of the most distinctive
features of Vancouver's startup ecosystem is the high percentage of firms
that obtain public financing. Public offerings play a unique role in
Vancouver, which is not seen in any US tech region. This reliance on public
financing does not appear beneficial, however, given how few Vancouver
startups scale into profitable businesses.4 7
In light of these data, the natural question becomes why Vancouver trails
American cities. Does Canadian or BC law hinder Vancouver startup
companies? Or do economic factors play a larger role? What can policy
makers do to improve Vancouver's economic performance? These questions
are addressed in Part III and Part IV below.

III.

LEGAL FACTORS
The data discussed in Part II show significant economic disparities between

Canadian and US cities. This Part III addresses whether these disparities
are the result of legal factors. To conduct this inquiry, we focus on seven

"

Note, however, that some studies have found that TSX-V companies generally perform
well. See e.g. Michele Meoli et al, "Can Spending Time in the Minors Pay Off? An
Examination of the Canadian Junior Public Equity Markets" (2018) 56:S1 J Small Bus

Mgmt 88.
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areas of law that are particularly relevant to tech startups: (A) tax
policy/stock options; (B) securities regulation; (C) corporate law; (D)
labour law; (E) bankruptcy/insolvency; (F) immigration; and (G) trade
policy. In the sections below, we summarize each of these legal areas in turn,
highlighting differences between Canada and the United States. Although

many of these areas are national in scope, we focus on the legal
environments in British Columbia and California (each of which are
shaped by federal and local laws).4 8What follows is a general survey, not an
exhaustive analysis. Unfortunately, space limitations preclude the detailed,
in-depth discussion that many of these areas deserve. That said, even a
general overview supports the finding that Canadian law does not impose
significant barriers to entrepreneurship.
A.

TAX POLICY

One of the most important ways that government can encourage or inhibit
entrepreneurship is through tax policy. Other things being equal, greater
after-tax

returns

to

entrepreneurship

increase

the

"supply"

of

entrepreneurial activity. Empirical research suggests that higher corporate
and personal income taxation discourages entrepreneurship, whereas lower
taxes can attract geographically mobile inventors? 9 Similarly, lower capital
gains taxes may "unlock" equity investment, with high capital gains taxes
having the opposite effect.50 Subjecting employee stock options to full
income taxation can reduce the ability of startups to incentivize skilled

4

9

For most of these areas of law, provincial differences are not significant. Thus, much of
our analysis of British Columbia applies to other provinces as well. Among American
states, California's laws are somewhat more unique.
See Ufuk Akcigit, Salome Baslandze & Stefanie Stantcheva, "Taxation and the
International Mobility of Inventors" (2016) 106:10 Am Econ Rev 2930; Ufuk Akcigit
& Stefanie Stantcheva, "Taxation and Innovation: What Do We Know?" (2020)
National Bureau of Economic Research Writing Working Paper No 27109.

o

See Vijay Jog, "The Lifetime Capital Gains Exemption: Corporate Financing, Risk-

Taking and Allocation Efficiency" (1995) 21:3 Can Pub Pol'y 116 at 126-34; James M
Poterba, "Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation" (1989) 3 Tax Pol'y Econ 47 at

56-63.
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employees." Finally, specific tax incentives for research and development
can help correct the market failure inherent in R&D spending."
In both Canada and the United States, taxes are levied at both the
federal and state/provincial levels. Although it is commonly assumed that
taxes are higher in Canada, total personal income taxes (i.e., federal and

local) are comparable in California and British Columbia, while business
taxation is actually lower in British Columbia. The top combined personal
rate in British Columbia is 53.5% 53-hardly

ideal5 -but

the combined rate

in California is nearly as high at 50.3%." Business taxation, especially for
small companies, is more favorable in British Columbia. A corporation
based in California pays a combined rate of 29.84%,56 while a company

51

See Department of Finance Canada, "The Budget Plan 2000" (28 February 2000) at

&

230, online (pdf): <budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/budget00/pdf/bpe.pdf>; Ronald Gilson

David Schizer, "Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for

Convertible Preferred Stock" (2003) 116:3 Harv L Rev 874 at 880-81, 913; Scott
Ollivierre, "The Influence of Taxation on Capital Structure in Venture Capital
Investments in Canada and the United States" (2010) 68:1 UT Fac L Rev 9.
52

Because there are positive externalities to R&D (innovative firms cannot fully capture
the social benefits of their innovations), individual firms will underinvest in R&D from

a social welfare perspective. Targeted subsidies can help correct this market failure. See
Robert Hamilton, "Tax Incentives and Innovation: The Canadian Treatment of R&D"
(1993) 19 Can-USLJ 233 at 238-39.
For federal and provincial tax rates, see "Canadian Income Tax Rates for Individuals

-

5

Current and Previous Years" (last modified 21 January 2020) online: Government of

Canada <canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/individuals/frequently-askedquestions-individuals/canadian-income-tax-rates-individuals-current-previous-

years.html>.
5

Higher personal income taxes have a negative effect on entrepreneurship. See Ergete
Ferede, "Entrepreneurship and Personal Income Tax: Evidence from Canadian
Provinces" (2019) 56:4 Small Bus Econ 1 (for evidence from the Canadian context).

5

See Katherine Loughead, "State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2020" (4
February

2020),

online:

Tax

Foundation

<taxfoundation

.org/state-individual-income-tax-rates-and-brackets-for-2020/>. Dividend income is
also subject to an additional 3.8% net investment income tax.
56

See Janelle Cammenga, "State Corporate Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2020" (28
January 2020), online: Tax Foundation <taxfoundation.org/state-corporate-income-tax-
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based in British Columbia pays a combined rate of 27%, which becomes
just 11% if the company can claim the Canadian small business deduction.5 7
Double taxation, an inherent issue in taxing corporations, 58 is treated
differently in the two countries. Businesses in the United States can avoid
double taxation by organizing as a limited liability company or S

corporation,59 whereas Canada features an integrated corporate tax system
by which shareholders receive a dividend credit for corporate taxes paid.60
In practice, most US startups organize as fully taxable C corporations,'

meaning the Canadian system results in lower taxes overall. Another tax
advantage-one particularly important to entrepreneurs-is that Canadian
taxation of capital gains is more favorable than in California, especiallywith
respect to startup companies. In California, long-term capital gains are
taxed at a maximum combined rate of 33.3%.62 In British Columbia, only

50% of capital gains are included in taxable income, meaning capital gains
are effectively taxed at 50% of ordinary income rates-thus, a maximum of

rates-brackets-2020/>. Note that state corporate income taxes are based on physical

location, not state of incorporation.
7

See "Corporation Tax Rates" (last modified 9 April 2021), online: Government of
Canada <canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/corporations

/corporation-tax-rates.html>.
s

"Double taxation" refers to taxing business profits once at the corporate level and a
second time at the personal level (when distributed to shareholders).

9

Dividend income and capital gains are also taxed at preferred rates.
See Robin Boadway & Jean-Frangois Tremblay, Corporate Tax Reform: Issues and

60

Prospectsfor Canada, (Toronto: Mowat Centre, 2014) at 11.
61

This preference for C corporations is itselftax driven. Venture capital funds are usually
organized as limited partnerships, which under the US tax code, pass through the
amounts and characterization of income and losses to their investors. Many tax-exempt
investors such as foundations and pension funds wish to avoid unrelated business
taxable income, and therefore require strict limits on investments in pass-through
entities.

62

See Amir EI-Sibaie, "2020 Tax Brackets" (14 November 2019), online: Tax Foundation
<taxfoundation.org/2020-tax-brackets/>.

In addition to the capital gains rate, US

taxpayers must pay a 3.8% net investment income tax, bringing the total tax on capital

gains to 37.1%. Moreover, the federal capital gains rate is likely to increase under the
Biden administration, increasing Canada's advantage.
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26.75%.63 Moreover, Canadian investors in qualified "Canadian-controlled
private corporations" (CCPCs)6" are entitled to a cumulative lifetime
capital gains exemption of $866,912: a tax break designed to encourage
small business investment.65 The combined effect of these policies is
significantly lower taxation of investments in Canadian startups.66

Another important issue is tax treatment of stock options. The ability to
issue stock options is vital to startup companies, as it allows them to
incentivize employees while conserving cash. In general, stock options are
taxed similarly in Canada and the United States, with certain advantages for
CCPCs. In both countries, stock options are not taxed upon issuance-

instead, grantees defer taxation until they exercise their options. Under the
Canadian system, the difference upon exercise between an option's strike
price and the current value of the underlying stock is taxed at capital gains
rates (i.e., 50% income exclusion), so long as the strike price reflects the "fair
market value" of the underlying shares when the option was issued.67
63

The tax treatment of capital gains by British Columbia and the federal government is
identical.

"4

As discussed below, CCPCs receive a number of important tax advantages.
Note,

however, that in order to maintain their tax status, CCPCs may not be controlled,
directly or indirectly, by non-Canadian shareholders. This means that many CCPCs
lose their tax benefits upon accepting US venture capital investment. Unfortunately, the
loss of CCPC Scientific Research and Experimental Development credits can have a
major negative impact on a company's profitability. See "Scientific Research and
Experimental Development Tax Incentive-Overview"

(31 March 2020), online:

Government of Canada <canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/scientific-researchexperimental-development-tax-incentive-program/

overview.html>.
5

66

See Kenneth

J

McKenzie & Aileen

J

Thompson, "The Impact of the Capital Gains

Exemption on Capital Markets" (1995) 21 Can Pub Pol'y 100 at 1.
In our research for this article, we interviewed several Vancouver-based attorneys active
in representing startup companies and venture capital investors. Our interviewees were

unanimous in their opinion that the lifetime capital gains exemption for CCPCs
encourages investments by both founders and angel investors.
6

See "Proposed Changes to the Stock Option Benefit Rules to Take Effect
on July 1,

2021" (8 March 2021), online: BDO Canada <bdo.ca/en-ca/Insights/Tax/TaxAlerts/Stock-option-taxation-proposed-changes>. The Liberal government recently
proposed a $200,000 annual limit on employee stock options that qualify for capital
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Employers have broad latitude to set low strike prices (nominal valuations
of 60% of the company's last-round financing are common), thereby
maximizing employees' potential returns.68 If the issuing company is a
CCP C, tax treatment is even more favorable: There is no requirement with
respect to CCPCs that the strike price reflect fair market value, and the

grantee is not taxed until the options are exercised and the underlying stock
is sold. Moreover, any increase in value of the underlying shares between
exercise and sale is subject to the lifetime capital gains exemption.69 Thus, at
least for CCPCs, Canadian taxation of stock options is more favorable than
in the United States. 70
Another way in which tax policy can affect innovation is through
incentives for research and development spending. In this area, Canada has
some of the most generous programs in the world." The federal Scientific
Research and Experimental Development credit (SR&ED) provides a
refundable tax credit to CCPCs of up to 35% of qualified R&D

expenditures

(and a 15% non-refundable

credit to non-CCPC

gains treatment. This limit will be based on the fair market value of the underlying
shares at the time the options are granted. Fortunately, CCPCs and all companies with
less than $500 million of annual revenues will be excluded from the new limit, reducing
its impact on startup companies. See Department of Finance Canada, Supporting
Canadiansand Fighting COVID-19, (Ottawa: DOF, 2020) at 113-14.
68

Nominal valuations lower than the company's last-round financing reflect the illiquidity

and subordination of common versus preferred shares. See "Rewarding Talent" (last
Index
Venture
<indexventures.com/
3 August
2021),
online:
visited
rewardingtalent/handbook>.
69

See Department of Finance Canada, "Backgrounder: Proposed Changes to the Tax
Treatment of Employee Stock Options" (17June 2019), online: Government of Canada
<canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2019/06/backgrounder-proposed-changes-

to-the-tax-treatment-of-employee-stock-options.html>.
O

Stock options face additional disadvantages in the United States, including limits on
what can be deemed "qualified stock options." The venture capital firm Index Ventures
has published a comparison of the tax treatment of incentive stock options across
Europe, North America, and Israel. In its report, Index Ventures ranks Canada in the

top three most favorable countries, placing it higher than the United States. See
"Rewarding Talent", supra note 68.
71

See Hamilton, supra note 52 at 233.
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businesses). 2 British Columbia also offers a provincial SR&ED which
grants CCPCs a refundable credit of 10% of R&D expenditures up to $3
million, and grants non-CCPCs (as well as CCPCs that have exhausted

their refundable credit) a 10% non-refundable credit. 73 Refundable tax
credits are an important source of financing for Canadian startups that have

not achieved profitability.74 For comparison, similar credits in the United
States are capped at 20% of R&D expenditures and are generally non-

refundable, limiting their benefit to pre-profit startups.75
In addition to R&D subsidies, the government of British Columbia
provides province-specific tax benefits to venture capital investors. The
largest of these is the "small business venture capital tax credit;' a refundable
credit equal to 30% of any equity investment in a registered "eligible
business corporation" or "venture capital corporation."76 First introduced in
the 1980s, the goal of this program is to encourage investment in BC
startups and to ameliorate the historical shortage of venture capital in
British Columbia.77 The benefits of this program are questionable, however.

72

See Government of Canada,supra note 64. Another widely used federal R&D program
is the Industrial Research Assistance Program. This policy provides grants (rather than
tax credits) which can be applied to a broad category of business activities. Many
companies stack SR&ED and Industrial Research Assistance Program funding together
to cover up to 75% of a given project's investment costs.

7

See Ministry of Finance, "British Columbia Scientific Research and Experimental
Development Tax Credit" (last modified 12 April 2021), online: Government of
Canada <canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/corporations
/provincial-territorial-corporation-tax/british-columbia-provincial-corporation-

tax/british-columbia-scientific-research-experimental-development-tax-credit.html>
7

-

This point was strongly emphasized by our interviewees. Indeed, many Canadian
venture capital firms offer specialized financing of future SR&ED refunds.
See "R&D Tax Incentives: United States, 2020" (2020), online (pdf): Organizationfor
Economic Cooperationand Development <oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats-united-states.pdf>

76

"Small Business Venture Capital Tax Credit-Province of British Columbia" (18 April
2019),

online:

<www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/taxes/income-taxes/corp

orate/credits/venture-capital>.
77

See Naomi Pope, "Briefing Note" (26 August 2013) at 8-10, online (pdf): Ministry of
Technology, Innovation and Citizens' Services <http://docs.openinfo.gov.bc.ca/
ResponsePackageFIN-2017-71796.pdf>; "Venture Capital Program" (13 March
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Although a 30% refundable credit is a generous investment subsidy, the
program is subject to a number of limitations that limit its economic
value-most importantly, the credit only applies to British Columbia
taxpayers, rendering it useless to the out-of-province investors that British
Columbia needs to attract.7 8 At a more basic level, directing investment

subsidies to specific, government-registered firms may distort market
outcomes and reduce the efficiency of the BC economy. 79
On the whole, tax policy in British Columbia is favorable to startup
companies. Although personal income taxes are high, business and
investment taxes are lower than many European countries and even certain
US states, including California. Given that British Columbia's tax
environment is at least as favorable as California's, tax law cannot explain
the province's weaker entrepreneurial performance.
B.

SECURITIES LAW

Other things being equal, less restrictive securities regulations facilitate
access to startup capital. Economic research indicates that fewer restrictions
on private offerings increase access to private capital, 80 while a streamlined
public offering process can facilitate IPOs.8 1 Thus, it is important to
2020),

online:

Province of British Columbia <www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/

employment-business/investment-capital/venture-capital-programs>.
78

See SmallBusiness Venture CapitalAct, RSBC 1996, c 429, ss 20(1), 28.1.

7

The specific criticism is that directed investment subsidies divert scarce financial
resources to underperforming businesses. For empirical research in the Canadian
context, see the work of Douglas Cumming and Jeffery MacIntosh. See e.g. Douglas J
Cumming, Sofia Johan & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "A Drop in an Empty Pond: Canadian

Public Policy Towards Venture Capital" (2017) 44 Econ Polit Ind 103 at 108-15;
Douglas J Cumming & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "Venture-Capital Exits in Canada and the
United States" (2003) 53:2 UTLJ 101 at 174-78; Douglas J Cumming & Jeffrey G
MacIntosh, "Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence" (2006) 21:5

J

Bus

Venturing 569 at 574. See also British Columbia, Ministry of Small Business,
Technology and Economic Development, An Evaluation ofthe Venture CapitalProgram

in British Columbia, by Thomas Hellmann & Paul Schure (2010) at 4-7.
s

See Ewens & Farre-Mensa, supra note 10.

s'

See Michael Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew T Gustafson, "The JOBS Act
and IPO Volume: Evidence that Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision" (2015)
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consider the efficiency of securities regulations in British Columbia,
particularly in comparison with California. 82 As discussed below, securities
regulations do not systematically disadvantage BC firms.

Under both US and BC securities law, companies may not issue
securities unless they have been registered under apublic offering document
or are subject to a specific registration exemption. For startups in the

United States, the most common exemption is section 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, which exempts "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering."83 There are two problems with this
exemption: (1) "notinvolving any public offering" is an uncertain concept
that has not been defined by statute, and (2) section

4

(a)(2) offerings are

not exempt from the overlapping patchwork of state securities law. To

address these issues, the US Securities and Exchange Commission has
provided a regulatory safe harbor under Regulation D.84 Also, offerings
pursuant to Rule 506 (a subsection of Regulation D) are exempt from state
registration requirements.85 However, Regulation D offerings are limited to

"accredited investors" (plus up to 35 sophisticated investors) and require
the filing of Form D, a disclosure document that can potentially reveal
competitively sensitive financial information.86

116:1 J Fin Econ 121; Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, "The Costs
and Benefits of Mandatory Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reactions to

the JOBS Act of 2012" (2016) 1:1 J L Fin & Accounting 139.
82

Securities regulations in the United States are primarily a function of federal law, though
state law also plays a role in certain circumstances (as discussed below). In Canada,
securities regulations are established by provincial law, with only a minor role for the
federal government.

"

15 USC § 77d(a)(2) (2018).

4

Regulation D provides safe harbor protections for certain transactions under s 4(a)(2):

See 17 CFR §230.500 etseq.
s

Offerings pursuant to Rule 506 were exempted from state registration requirements by
the CapitalMarketsEff1ciency Act of1996, 15 USC § 77r (2018).

86

See 17 CFR § 230.501(a), § 239.500. For discussion of why issuers prefer to avoid filing
Form D, see Danny Crichton & Arman Tabatabai, "The Disappearing Form D" (7
November

2018),

online:

Tech

crunch.com/2018/11/07/the-disappearing-form-d/>.

Crunch

<social.tech
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British Columbia securities law provides a broader array of registration
exemptions, including sales to: (1) directors, officers, employees, and
consultants; (2) family members of directors, officers, or controlling
shareholders; (3) close personal friends or close business associates of
directors, officers, or controlling shareholders; (4) "accredited investors";

and (5) any non-individual purchaser, so long as the purchase price is at
least $150,000.87 These exemptions are more flexible than the exemptions
in the US, and often do not require filing public disclosure documents.88
Moreover, because Canadian securities law is entirely provincial-with no
overlapping layer of federal securities law-BC startups face fewer

interjurisdictional concerns. Although issuers are subject to the regulations
of any province in which they sell securities, provincial regulations are
highly integrated in practice, minimizing the "blue sky" issues sometimes
faced by US issuers.89

With respect to public offerings, the IPO process is similar in Canada
and the United States. Like in the US, Canadian firms have multiple

options for accessing public markets. In addition to listing on the Toronto
Stock Exchange in a traditional IPO (the preferred exit strategy for the
highest-value growth companies), smaller and more speculative firms can
list on the TSX-V" though a variety of offering structures, including a
traditional IPO, a "reverse takeover" by a previously listed shell company, or
a public acquisition by a "capital pool company."" Given its focus on
smaller

emerging

companies,

the TSX-V

imposes less

stringent

capitalization, governance, and operational history requirements than larger

8'

See

"Private

&

Early

Stage

Businesses",

online:

British

Columbia

Securities Commission <bcsc.bc.ca/industry/issuer-regulation/raising-capital/private-

early-stage-businesses>.
ss

Certain exempted offerings (including sales to non-individual investors for at least
$150,000) require the filing of Form 45-106F1.

89

Note that there are exceptions to this integration. For example, registration exemptions

are somewhat narrower in Ontario (an important investor jurisdiction).
*

In addition to the TSX-V, the Canadian Securities Exchange is an even smaller venture
exchange available to Canadian startups.

"i

These structures are similar to "special purpose acquisition companies" in the US.
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exchanges. 92 Although listing on the TSX-V can provide startups with early
access to public capital, this financing strategy has disadvantages, as
discussed in Part IV.
Ultimately, the similarities between the United States and Canada
outweigh their differences. In fact, Canadian and US securities markets are

partially integrated: Under the Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System,
Canadian-listed companies can sell securities in the US, and US-listed
companies can sell securities in Canada. Moreover, many large Canadian
companies are registered and listed in both countries, obligating compliance
with both countries' securities laws. The upshot of these similarities is that
Canadian companies do not suffer any distinct regulatory disadvantage.
C.

CORPORATE LAW

As with securities law, greater flexibility in corporate law can facilitate
business investment. Corporate law scholarship is replete with evidence that
flexible corporate statutes and predictable judicial decisions have positive
effects on incorporation rates and real business activity.9 4 In the United
States, businesses may choose to incorporate in any state (regardless of
geographical location), and most sophisticated startups choose to
incorporate in Delaware, widely regarded as the US's most favorable
corporate jurisdiction." Canadian businesses enjoy similar jurisdictional
92

"

See Technical Guide to Listing (Toronto: TMX, 2020).
See Division of Corporate Finance "Financial Reporting Manual" (last updated 18

November 2020) at 362-69, online (pdf): US Securities and Exchange Commission
<sec.gov/files/cf-frm-nov202O.pdf>;

National

Instrument

71-101

The Multi-

Jurisdictional Disclosure System, BC Reg 343/98
"

See e.g. Raphael Amit et al, "Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation Across Countries"

(2007) World Bank Working Paper No 4313 at 28-31; Reiner Braun et al, "Does
Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A Difference-in-Difference Approach
4

to European Company Law Reforms" (2013) 51:3J Common Market Stud 399 at 0001, 413-14; Marcel Kahan, "The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility,

Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?" (2006) 22:2JL Econ & Org34 0 at 341,36364.
"

See "Choosing a Jurisdiction Comparison Chart: C-Corporations" in PracticalLaw
Corporateand Securities(Thomson Reuters Practical Law); Brian Broughman, Jesse M
Fried & Darian Ibrahim, "Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence"
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freedom,96 though most BC startups incorporate locally under BC law.97
Since most California-based startups incorporate in Delaware and most BC
startups incorporate in BC, the most useful comparison for present
purposes is between Delaware and BC law.

The Business CorporationsAct98 is British Columbia's primary business
organizations statute. With respect to flexibility and ease of use, it is neither
obviously inferior nor obviously superior to the Delaware General

CorporationLaw.99 Originally derived from English law, the BCA is hardly
an exemplar of clarity and concision, but in this regard, it fares no worse
than the similarly abstruse DGCL. Although the BCA is somewhat less

flexible regarding fundamental transactions (requiring a supermajority
shareholder vote for amalgamations, for example), these requirements can
be easily avoided with a well-drafted shareholders' agreement. A more
serious disadvantage of British Columbia is not the statute itself, but rather
the province's less developed case law. Although British Columbia's courts

(2014) 57:4
California

J

Law Econ 865; Jaspreet Mann, "Where to Incorporate Your Business:
or

Delaware?"

online:

DLA

Piper

<dlapiperaccelerate

.com/knowledge/2017/where-to-incorporate-your-business-california-or-

delaware.html>.
96

In addition to incorporating under the law of anyprovince, Canadian corporations may

also incorporate under the federal CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, RSC 1985, c C44.
>

There is less substantive variation in provincial corporate law than there is among
American states. Moreover, no single province dominates corporate law in Canada the

way that Delaware does in the United States. Most smaller businesses simply incorporate
in their home province. For analyses of corporate law competition (or the absence
thereof) in Canada, see Douglas J Cumming & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "The Role of
Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law" (2000) 20:2 Int'l
Rev L & Econ 141; Camden Hutchison, "Corporate Law Federalism in Historical

Context: Comparing Canada and the United States" (2018) 64:1 McGill LJ 109;
Camden Hutchison, "Pluralism and Convergence:Judicial Standardization in Canadian

Corporate Law" (2021) 58:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 163 [Hutchison, "Pluralism and
Convergence"].
98

Business CorporationsAct, SBC 2002, c 57 [BCA].

9

General CorporationLaw, Del Code Ann tit 8 [DGCL].
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are competent and reliable,100 they lack the volume of precedent that can
increase the certainty of litigation. 101
The BCA also provides certain advantages, however. The Act's

supermajority voting requirements-although reducing flexibility-are
characteristic of Canadian law's strong shareholder protections, which
benefit outside investors. The Act's statutory oppression remedy,10 2
unknown to American law, is a potent defense against management
exploitation.103 The plan of arrangement process-similarly absent from
American
law-is a flexible and effective tool for conducting acquisitions and

restructurings.104 With respect to forming corporations themselves, BC
companies can be formed easily and quickly (though not as quickly as in
Delaware),1 5 are permitted to issue an unlimited number of shares (with or
without par value), and are not required to pay franchise taxes.10 6 Finally, in
comparison with other Canadian corporations acts, the BCA

has a specific

advantage: Unlike certain Canadian statutes, including the Ontario
Business CorporationsAct and the Canada Business CorporationsAct, the
BCA imposes no Canadian

residency requirements

on corporate

10

This is the general view of BC practitioners, as confirmed by our interviewees.

101

Although the volume ofprecedent has increased over time, it does not approach that of
Delaware. See Hutchison, "Pluralism and Convergence", supra note 97.

102

See BC-I, supra note 98, s 227.

103

The Canadian oppression remedy has famously been described as "the broadest, most
comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder remedy in the common law world.":
SM Beck, "Minority Shareholders' Rights in the 1980s" in Law Society of Upper

Canada, CorporateLaw in the '80s (Don Mills: R De Boo, 1982) 311 at 311-12.
10

See BCA, supra note 98, ss 288-99.

"0

In British Columbia, the expedited registration process takes one to two business days.

Expedited incorporation in Delaware can take less than an hour.
106 The time, cost, and complexity of starting a business are important factors in the World

Bank's

Doing Business report.

See

<doingbusiness.org/en/methodology>.

"Methodology",

online:

World Bank

Of 190 countries, Canada ranks 3rd on

"starting a business" (though only 23rd in the overall tanking).
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directors,1 07 a welcome source of flexibility for foreign venture capital
investors.
Ultimately, there is no significant disadvantage to incorporating under

BC law. Looking beyond corporations per se, one shortcoming of BC law is
the complete absence oflimited liability companies-a disadvantage shared
by all Canadian provinces. However, given (1) Canada's integrated

corporate tax system, which mitigates double taxation issues, (2) the
availability of "GP-LP" structures that can effectively simulate LLCs,1 08 and
(3) venture capitalists' strong preference for investing in corporations even

in the United States,' it is doubtful the absence of LLCs has a significant
impact on BC startups. Thus, even compared to Delaware law, the BCA is
perfectly adequate for most investors and entrepreneurs.
D.

LABOUR LAW

Labour law is particularly important to startup companies, as the most
valuable asset of many startups is the knowledge of their employees.
Whether startups benefit or lose from strong labour laws is ambiguous,
however. On the one hand, startups require legal flexibility in hiring, firing,

and compensation in order to respond to changing market conditions."'0 It
is crucially important that startups are free to set hours and pay,

performance expectations, and conditions of employment with their
workers. On the other hand, many scholars have argued that limiting
employers' freedom to enforce non-competition
i0m

agreements ("non-

See BCA, supra note 98, s 124. The other provinces that do not impose director
residency requirements are New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and

Quebec. As of this writing, the Ontario Legislative Assembly has introduced legislation
(Bill 213) to eliminate the director residency requirements from the Business

CorporationsAct.

108

By GP-LP structures, we mean limited partnerships in which the general partner is a
corporation. Investors can make capital contributions as limited partners while sharing
management rights through the corporate GP. If properly designed, these structures can
provide many of the advantages of LLCs.

109

Supra note 61.

"0

See Magnus Henrekson, "Entrepreneurship: A Weak Link in the Welfare State?" (2005)

14:3 Ind Corp Change 437 at 454-55 [Henrekson, "Entrepreneurship"].
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competes") can provide spillover benefits for the surrounding economic
region."' Most famously, Ronald Gilson has argued that California's
unusual blanket prohibition of non-competes" 2 -and

the resulting

economic culture of competition, labour mobility, and interfirm knowledge
transfer-was a key factor in the development of Silicon Valley." 3

Like all Canadian provinces, courts in British Columbia are reluctant to
enforce non-competes, a policy inherited from English common law." 4
Unlike California, however, non-competes are not statutorily prohibited,
and Canadian courts will enforce "reasonable" non-competition
agreements." 5 According to the Supreme Court of Canada, covenants in
restraint of trade (including non-competes)

are enforceable

if the

challenged covenant is reasonable between the parties and with reference to
the public interest.1 1 6 This reasonability hinges on whether (1) the
employer has a proprietary right entitled to protection (e.g., trade secrets or
specific intellectual property),"17 (2) the covenant is reasonable in terms of
duration and geographical scope," 8 and (3) the employer could protect its
interest by relying on a narrower contractual remedy (such as a limited nonsolicitation covenant)." 9 While many non-competes have failed this test,
"

See e.g. On Amir & Orly Lobel, "How Noncompetes Stifle Performance" (Jan/Feb
2014) 92:1/2 Harv Bus Rev 26; Gilson, "The Legal Infrastructure" supra note 11; Orly

Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free: Why We Should Learn to Love Leaks, Raids,

and Free

Riding (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013) at 49-75; Sampsa Samila & Olav
Sorenson, "Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth"

(2011) 57:3 Mgmt Sci 425 at 428-29,436.
12

Cal Civ Code § 16600 (1872).

13

See Gilson, "The Legal Infrastructure" supra note 11.

4

See e.g. Valley First Financial Services Ltd v Trach, 2004 BCCA 312 at para 44 [Valley
First].

115

Ibid.

16

See

JG Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd v Elsley,

[1978] 2 SCR 916 at 923-29, 83 DLR

(3d)1.
117 Ibid at para 19.
"8

See Terra Engineering Ltd v Stewart, 1994 Carswell BC 1761 at paras 18-23, 1994
CanLII 590.

"9

See Valley First, supra note 114 at para 50.
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many have been upheld.120 Thus, despite being judicially disfavored, noncompetes are more enforceable in British Columbia than California.
Gilson's study of Silicon Valley implies the enforceability of noncompetes may be harmful to the BC tech economy. We question whether
this legal difference has a meaningful effect on startup activity, however, for

two reasons. First, in all jurisdictions-including California-there are
powerful non-legal1 2 ' mechanisms to retain employees and prevent
competition. The most common such mechanism is granting incentive

equity such in the form of stock options or restricted stock. Although
incentive equity does not provide the legal security of a binding contract, by
aligning the economic interests of the company and the employee, it can
serve as a powerful retention mechanism-particularly if subject to a
"clawback" provision triggered by the employee's departure. 22 Second, even
in jurisdictions where non-competes are enforceable, firms are subject to
market forces that discourage their enforcement. As Robert Gomulkiewicz
argues, firms are reluctant to enforce non-competes for a variety of
economic reasons, including (1) the cost and risks of litigation (including
disclosure of trade secrets in discovery), (2) reputational harm, (3) the
possibility of wayward employees returning to the fold (perhaps with new
knowledge and skills), (4) a desire to avoid antagonizing competitors, and
(5) a strong cultural norm against enforcement of non-competes. 2 3 This

120 Some non-competes that have survived legal challenge have been very broad. See e.g.
ACS Public SectorSolutions Inc v Courthouse TechnologiesLtd, 2005 BCCA 605 (where

a 12-month non-compete covering the entirety of North America was upheld as
reasonable).
121

By "non-legal" we simply mean other than by enforcement of contractual covenants.

122

Diana Hembree, "Startup Employee Alert: Can Your Company Take Back Your Vested
Shares?"

(10

January

2018),

online:

Forbes

<forbes.com/

sites/dianahembree/2018/01 / 10/startup-employee-alert-can-your-company-take-back-

your-vested-stock-options/>.
123

See

Robert

Gomulkiewicz,

"Leaky

Covenants-not-to-Compete

as

the Legal

Infrastructure for Innovation" (2015) 49:1 UC Davis L Rev 251 at 280-86.
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last factor may be the most significant. Silicon Valley's cultural norms of
knowledge sharing and labour mobility12 4 appear to have spread globally.
Our interviews with practitioners confirm that these market norms are
present in Vancouver, notwithstanding the legal enforceability of noncompetes. Vesting equity is common,12 5 and employers face the same market

constraints on enforcing non-competes as identified by Gomulkiewicz.
Given the small size of the Vancouver labour market, the reputational risks
of suing former employees are significant. Conversely, non-competes may

be less valuable due to the size of the market itself: Compared to Silicon
Valley, a smaller number of tech companies means less demand for skilled
labour, which translates into less "poaching" of competitors' employees,
reduced labour mobility, and ultimately lower salaries. As Vancouver's tech
economy grows and the labour market becomes more competitive, noncompetes may eventually become a more consequential legal issue. For now,
however, differences in legal enforceability are less important than market
practices.
Apart from non-competes, the only other significant difference between
California and BC law is that British Columbia-like all Canadian
provinces-is not an "at will" employment jurisdiction. This often comes as
an unpleasant surprise to US venture capital investors, but the consequences
of BC's employment protections are not prohibitively onerous, so long as
appropriately drafted employment agreements are put in place. Under BC
law, employees are entitled to a contractual minimum of one week's prior
notice of termination without cause (or payment in lieu thereof), up to a
maximum of eight weeks' notice for employees who have worked eight

124

See generally AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in
Silicon Valley and Route 128, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996);

Gilson, "The Legal Infrastructure", supra note 11. In studying Silicon Valley, Gilson and
Saxenian observe the same phenomena regarding collaboration and competition. While

Saxenian ascribes these phenomena to regional economic culture, Gilson suggests that
legal differences influence culture itself.
125

See Scott McLeod "Why Successful Emerging Tech Companies Offer Employee Stock
Option

Incentives"

(16

September

2019),

online:

Clark

Wilson

LLP

<cwilson.com/why-successful-emerging-tech-companies-offer-employee-stock-optionincentives/>.
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years or more.' 2 6 Most workers are entitled to only a few weeks'
notice/severance-a minor financial obligation that is more than offset by
2 7

Vancouver's lowwages.1

In almost every other respect, British Columbia is

much closer to the flexible American labour market than the highly
protective labour systems characteristic of European countries, which often
serve as an obstacle to both hiring and entrepreneurship. 28
E.

BANKRUPTCY/INSOLVENCY

Several studies have examined the relationship between bankruptcy law and
entrepreneurship.'
126

127

In general, these studies have found that more

See Employment StandardsAct, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 63. The notice/severance scale is

roughly one week's notice/severance per year of employment.
Note, however, that if no specific notice/severance provision is included in an
employment agreement (or if the notice/severance provision contains legal defects),
courts may award common law severance, which can be much greater than the statutory
minimums. For this reason, it is important that each employee sign a valid employment
agreement upon commencement of employment.

128

See e.g. Ant Bozkaya & William R Kerr, "Labor Regulations and European Venture

Capital"

(2014)

23:4

J

Econ

&

Mgmt

Strategy

776

at

780-81,

803-04; Federico Cingano et al, "The Effects of Employment Protection Legislation
and Financial Market Imperfections on Investment: Evidence From a Firm-level Panel of

EU

Countries"

(2010)

25:61

Econ

Pol'y

117

at

138-40;

Henrekson,

"Entrepreneurship", supra note 110 at 454-55; Magnus Henrekson & Mikael Stenkula,

"Entrepreneurship and Public Policy" in Zoltan J Acs & David B Audretsch, eds,
Handbook ofEntrepreneurshipResearch:An InterdisciplinarySurvey and Introduction,
2nd ed (New York: Springer, 2010) 595 at 613-15; David B Audretsch et al, "An
Eclectic Theory of Entrepreneurship: Policies, Institutions and Culture" in David B
Audretsch et al, eds, Entrepreneurship:Determinants and Policy in a European-US
Comparison, vol 27 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) 11 at 47; Andr6 van Stel,

David J Storey & A Roy Thurik, "The Effect of Business Regulations on Nascent and
Young Business Entrepreneurship" (2007) 28:2/3 Small Bus Econ 171 at 180-83.
See e.g. John Armour & Douglas J Cumming, "Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship"

(2008) 10:2 Am L & Econ Rev 303 [Armour & Cumming "Bankruptcy"];Jay Barney et
al, "How Do Bankruptcy Laws Affect Entrepreneurship Development Around the
World?" (2011) 26:5

J Bus

Venturing 505; Geraldo Cerqueiro & Maria Penas, "How

Does Personal Bankruptcy Law Affect Start-Ups?" (2016) 30:7 Rev Fin Stud;

Cumming, supra note 9; Wei Fan & Michelle White, "Personal Bankruptcy and the
Level of Entrepreneurial Activity" (2003) 46:2 J Law Econ 543.
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forgiving bankruptcy rules encourage entrepreneurial activity.30 A specific

finding is that greater protection of debtors' assets in bankruptcy increases
the rate of new business formation.' 3 ' The economic logic is intuitive-the
greater the extent to which debtors can protect their assets, the greater their
willingness to take financing risks.

32

Although Canadian and US bankruptcy laws are similar, there are
important legal differences with respect to personal bankruptcy. One
difference is that US jurisdictions provide greater homestead exemptions.1
These exemptions shield a debtor's equity in their primary residence, up to
a specified dollar amount. The literature suggests that higher homestead
exemptions encourage entrepreneurship, particularly in geographic regions
with high real estate values.13 4 If home equity is protected in the bankruptcy
process, then individuals whose personal wealth is tied to homeownership

face reduced financial risk when starting a business.
California's homestead exemption is relatively generous, allowing
homeowners to shield US$75,000 (for individuals) or US$100,000 (for

See Armour & Cumming, "The Legislative Road", supra note 9 at 601-28; Armour

&

130

Cumming, "Bankruptcy", supra note 129; Barney et al, supra note 129; Fan & White,
supra note 129. See also Cumming & Li, supra note 9 at 357-64; Cerqueiro & Penas,
supra note 129.
31

See Barney et al, supra note 129 at 513-17; Fan & White, supra note 129 at 563-64.

132 Although entrepreneurs can protect their assets by organizing their businesses as limited

liability entities, many first-time entrepreneurs are forced to use personal credit and/or
personal guaranties to finance initial startup costs. This is particularly true in Vancouver,

which has an underdeveloped venture capital market.
33

In both the United States and Canada, bankruptcy legislation is national. However, the
bankruptcy laws of both countries delegate exemption rules to the individual states and
provinces.

134

Several studies have found a positive relationship between real estate values and
entrepreneurship. See e.g. Stefano Corradin & Alexander Popov, "House Prices, Home

Equity Borrowing, and Entrepreneurship" (2015) 28:8 Rev Fin Stud 2399; John
Harding & Stuart Rosenthal, "Homeownership, Housing Capital Gains and Self-

Employment" (2017) 99 J Urb Fin 120; Martin C Schmalz, David A Sraer & David
Thesmar, "Housing Collateral and Entrepreneurship" (2017) 72:1 J Fin 99.
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family units) from creditors in bankruptcy. 35 Washington's exemption is
even higher at US$125,000. 36 Like most Canadian provinces, British
Columbia offers meagre exemptions, protecting CAN$12,000 for debtors
in Vancouver and Victoria, and even less for debtors elsewhere in British
Columbia.13 7 Given the importance of homestead exemptions in high-

priced real estate markets (such as Vancouver), British Columbia's

low

bankruptcy exemptions may discourage entrepreneurship.

Homestead exemptions are not the only area in which Canadian law is
less forgiving. Other features of Canadian law can impose onerous
requirements on insolvent debtors. Rather than receiving an immediate
discharge, Canadian debtors can face "surplus income" payments for up to
21 months following bankruptcy.1 38 Debtors also face reporting,
counseling, and other legal obligations for a minimum of nine months.13 1
This is in contrast with the United States, where debtors receive a fresh
start (i.e., discharge of all financial obligations) within 60 days of the courtsupervised meeting of creditors."' In terms of debt recovery (i.e., how
much debtors actually repay), studies show that Canadian creditors recover
more than their US counterparts in commercialbankruptcies."i Although
we are unaware of similar evidence regarding personalbankruptcies, it is at

135

See California Code of Civil Procedure §704.730. The exemption is as high as
US$175,000 for certain vulnerable debtors. See ibid.

13

See RCW § 6.13.030.

137

See BC Reg 216/2019, s 3.

13

Bankruptcy and Insolvency

Act,

RSC 1985, c B-3, ss 68, 168.1. These payments can

continue for up to 36 months if the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
139

See ibid, s 158.

40

See Fed R Bankr P 4 00 4 (a). Debtors liquidate their nonexempt assets to repay creditors
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtors can also propose a repayment plan
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition to liquidation, Canadian debtors
can make a repayment "proposal" analogous to Chapter 13. The availability of this
proposal process mitigates the severity of the Canadian liquidation regime. See 11 US

Code § 701-84, 1301-30.
41

See Seung-Hyun Lee, Mike W Peng & Yasuhiro Yamakawa, "Bankruptcy Laws and
Entrepreneur-Friendliness" (2010) 34:3 Entrepreneurship Theory Prac 517 at 521.
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least plausible that this advantage applies to personal bankruptcies as well,
particularly in light of the harsh rules faced by individual Canadian debtors.
The real question is whether these harsher bankruptcy rules inhibit
entrepreneurship. Although the risk of bankruptcy is a serious issue for
entrepreneurs, there are reasons to doubt bankruptcy law's influence on

high-technology startup companies. One reason is that many sophisticated
startups can access specialized equity financing (e.g., angel financing and

venture capital) and are less reliant on traditional debt financing. Even
when venture capitalists invest in convertible or secured notes, they rarely
demand rights to recover against founders personally. That said, many
entrepreneurs nevertheless take on personal debt when first starting a
business. 2 Ultimately, while we do not argue that bankruptcy law has a
decisive effect on Canadian startups (an argument best reserved for future
empirical research), we would encourage Canadian legislators to consider
potential bankruptcy reforms. We return to this issue in our conclusion.
F.

IMMIGRATION

Immigrants play a key role in innovation and entrepreneurship. Not only do
immigrants have high rates of entrepreneurship, they also fill an important
need as technology workers for existing firms. Immigrants to Canada are
more likely to start businesses than the native-born population"3 and

42

See supra note 132. Janis Sarra finds that many Canadian entrepreneurs comingle

business and personal debt, and that "business failure, use of personal line of credit for
business" is a major cause of insolvency proposals. See Janis P Sarra, Micro, Small and

Medium Enterprise (MSME) Insolvency in Canada (Vancouver: Allard Research
Commons, 2016) at 4-7, 29, 46. In the United States, Sergey Brin and Lawrence Page

founded Google using "all of our credit cards and our friends' credit cards and our
parents credit cards.": Robert M Lawless, "Striking Out on Their Own: The

Self-Employed in Bankruptcy" in Katherine Porter, ed, Broke: How DebtBankruptsthe
Middle Class (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012) at 101.
4s

See ImmigrantEntrepreneurship:
BarriersandFacilitatorsto Growth (Toronto: Diversity
Institute, Ted Rogers School of Management, 2019) at 7. Even refugees to Canada are

more likely to start businesses than native-born Canadians. Garnett Picot & Yuri
Ostrovsky, "Research Blog: Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Canada" (28 August 2018),
online: Statistics Canada <statcan.gc.ca/eng/blog/cs/immigrant-entrepreneurs>.
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immigrant-founded companies create jobs at a faster rate than their nativefounded counterparts.4 In the United States, approximately 25% of
startup companies (and more than 40% of startups companies based in
California) are founded or co-founded by first-generation immigrants," 5
despite the fact that immigrants represent approximately 15% of the
national population.'46 More than half of all "unicorns" have at least one
immigrant founder,1 47 and more than 40% of Fortune 500 companies were
founded by first- or second-generation immigrants. 48 Anecdotally, many of

the most valuable and celebrated companies in both countries-including
Google, Tesla, and Shopify-were founded or co-founded by immigrants.
Although Canada and the United States are both high-immigration
countries with liberal immigration policies, 4 9 Canada is more aggressive in
targeting and recruiting highly skilled immigrants. The centerpiece of
Canadian immigration policy is the Express Entry program, a points-based

intake system that selects immigrants on the basis of language skills,
education, professional experience, and other merit and integration
criteria. 1' High-scoring applicants quickly become eligible for permanent
144

See ImmigrantEntrepreneursasJob Creators:The Case ofCanadianPrivateIncorporated
Companies, by Garnett Picot & Anne-Marie Rollin, in

Analytical Studies

Branch

Research PaperSeries, Catalogue No 11F0019M no 423 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,

2019).
145

See Sari Pekkala Kerr & William Kerr, "Immigrant Entrepreneurship in America:
Evidence from the Survey of Business Owners 2007 & 2012" (2020) 49:3 Research

Policy 103918 at 1, 6.
146

See "International Migrant Stock 2019: Graphs", online: United Nations Population

<un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration

Division

2

2

/data/estimates2/estimatesgraphs.asp ? g >.
147 See Stuart Anderson,

Immigrants andBillion-DollarCompanies (Arlington:

National

Foundation for American Policy, 2016) at 1.
1-i

See "New American Fortune 500 in 2019: Top American Companies and Their
Immigrant

Roots"

(22

July

2019),

online:

New

American

Economy

<data.newamericaneconorny.org/en/fortune500-2019/>.
149

At least relative to most countries in the world.

1

For a thorough description and critical analysis of the Express Entry system, see Asha
Kaushal, "Do the Means Change the Ends? Express Entry and Economic Immigration

in Canada" (2019) 42:1 Dal LJ 83.
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residence. Indeed, given the system's generous point cutoffs, Canada's
immigration rate, as a percentage of its population, is among the highest in
the world.5
States

In comparison, while the green card system in the United
features many pathways to immigration (including family

reunification, employer sponsorship, and the diversity lottery system), none

are directly tied to merit."' Waiting times under the green card system are
notoriously long, as the number of applicants far exceeds annual quotas for
most categories.' 3 Compounding these difficulties, the Trump
administration imposed several new barriers to immigration, including a
moratorium on newly issued green cards in 2020.154

11

Canada's annual immigration target is more than one percent of its total population. See
Immigration,

Refugees

and

Citizenship

Canada,

"Notice

- Supplementary Information for the 2021-2023 Immigration Levels Plan" (last
modified

18

June

2021),

online:

<canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees

-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-inmmigration-levels-2021-2023.html>. In the

United States, annual legal immigration (although much higher in absolute terms) is less
than 0.3% of the total population. See Abby Budiman, "Key Findings about U.S.
Immigrants" (20 August 2020), online <pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key152

findings-about-u-s-immigrants/>.
The complexity of the US immigration system defies any concise explanation. An
overview of the various green card eligibility criteria is available at "Green Cards and
Permanent Residence in the U.S." (last updated 10 June 2020), online: USAGov
<usa.gov/green-cards>.

153

See David J Bier, "Immigration Wait Times from Quotas Have Doubled: Green Card
Backlogs Are Long, Growing, and Inequitable" (18 June 2019), online: Cato Institute
<cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/immigration-wait-times-quotas-have-doubledgreen-card-backlogs-are-long>.
One issue with the US system is that each source country is assigned its own
immigration quota. This means skilled immigrants from high-emigration countries such

as India and China can face very high wait times. Since the Canadian system does not
discriminate on the basis on national origin (i.e., immigrants do not face country-

specific quotas), it can better accommodate differing immigration flows among
countries. This is particularly advantageous given the very high rate of entrepreneurship
among Indian and Chinese immigrants.
154

See "Proclamation Suspending Entry of Aliens who Present a Risk to the U.S. Labor
Market Following the Coronavirus Outbreak" (22 June 2020), online: Trump White

House <trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspendingentry-aliens-present-risk-u-s-labor-market-following-coronavirus-outbreak/>.
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In addition to the Express Entry system, Canada offers several programs
specifically for entrepreneurs. Under the federal Start-up Visa Program, for
example, foreign entrepreneurs can obtain permanent residence in Canada

by successfully applying to a recognized business incubator or by receiving
financial sponsorship from a recognized angel network or venture capital
firm. 5 At the provincial level,5 6 British Columbia's Provincial Nominee

Program-which targets specific categories of immigrants for settlement in
British Columbia-also offers an entrepreneurship pathway. 5 7 Under the
BC program, foreign investors willing to commit at least CA$200,000

under a registered business plan can obtain a temporary visa and eventually
apply for permanent residence.158 Although the US offers various
immigration pathways to skilled workers, it currently lacks a permanent
"startup visa" equivalent to Canada's.159 The US's International
measures include a number of important exemptions-most notably, they do not apply
to individuals already present in the United States.
155

"Start-up Visa Program" (28 March 2013), online: Immigration, Refrgees and
Citizenship

Canada

<canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/

immigrate-canada/start-visa.html>.

For angel networks, the minimum investment

amount is $75,000. For venture capital firms, the minimum investment amount is
$200,000. The structure of this program minimizes the abuses associated with "pay to
immigrate" programs, in that the immigrant entrepreneur must be endorsed by an

independent third party with skin in the game.

56

Although the Canadian immigration system is governed by federal law, provinces may
nominate applicants under the Express Entry system.

15

See

"BC

PNP-Entrepreneur

Immigration'"

online:

WelcomeBC

<welcome

bc.ca/Immigrate-to-B- C/B C-PNP-Entrepreneur-Immigration>.
15

See "Entrepreneur Immigration -

Base Category Process', online: WelcomeBC

<welcomebc.ca/Immigrate-to-B-C/BC-PNP-Entrepreneur-Imm

igration/Process#anchor4>.
1

Note that the US's EB-5 immigrant investor visa targets high-net-worth individuals (not
necessarily entrepreneurs) by requiring a minimum investment of $900,000 in the

United States. The program has primarily drawn investment in real estate, and has been
criticized for allowing wealthy investors to "buy" permanent-resident status by making
low-return investments. See Ron Nixon, "Program that Lets Foreigners Write a Check,
and Get a Visa, Draws Scrutiny" (15 March 2016), online: The New York Times

<nytimes.com/2016/03/16/us/politics/program-that-lets-foreigners-write-a-checkand-get-a-visa-draws-scrutiny.html#: :text=
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Entrepreneur Rule-similar in purpose to the Canadian Start-up Visa
Program-was effectively rescinded by the Trump administration in
2018.160
Beyond immigrants per se,16 1 Canadian law is even more flexible
regarding temporary foreign workers (many of whom in fact become
permanent residents). There are two primary avenues for nonimmigrants to
work in Canada: the Post-Graduation Work Permit Program (PGWPP)
and the Canadian Temporary Foreign Workers program (CTFW). 62 The

PGWPP allows foreign students to work full-time for up to three years
following graduation from a Canadian post-secondary institution,
regardless of area of study.1 63 Work experience gained under the PGWPP
The%20program%2C%20called%20EB%2D5,path%20to%20United%20States%20cit
izenship.>. This program differs from the Canadian Startup Visa Program, which
requires entrepreneurs to obtain financing from professional investors, but does not
require immigrants to invest their own capital.

16

As of this writing, the International Entrepreneur Rule is in a state of limbo. Although
the Trump administration gave formal notice of its intention to rescind the rule, no final
order was ever issued. See 83 FR 24415. Anecdotal evidence suggests that uncertainty

over the program's legal status has deterred applications, and that at least some
entrepreneurs waiting to immigrate to the United States have immigrated to Canada
instead. See Olivia Carville, "Trump Booted Foreign Startup Founders. Other
Countries

Embraced

Them"

(1

October

2018),

online:

Bloomberg

<bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-01 /trump-booted-foreign-startup-foundersother-countries-embraced-them>. The Biden administration intends to revitalize the
program. See Michelle Hackman, "Foreign Entrepreneurs to Gain More Access to

Immigration Program", Wall StreetJournal(10 May 2021).
161

That is, permanent migrants.

162

Canada also offers the International Mobility Program, which grants work permits
within a number of specific categories, including "working holiday" participants
(generally young people without dependents), film and television workers, and
professional athletes.

1

The length of a work permit under the PGWPP depends on the length of the study
program. The work permit is valid for three years if the study program is two years or
more. In other words, most international undergraduate students and many graduate
students are eligible for a three-year work permit. See "Work in Canada After You
Graduate: About the Process" (last modified 28 September 2020) online: Government
<canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services
Canada
of
/study-canada/work/after-graduation/about.html>.
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may be applied towards permanent residence under the Express Entry
program. The most comparable program in the United States-the
Optional Practical Training program (OPT)-allows only 12 months of
post-graduation employment, or 24 months for certain STEM fields."'
Rather than gaining permanent residence eligibility, OPT holders must
apply for regular work visas (H-1B) before their OPT authorization expires

in order to continue working in the US.'
Unlike in the United States, where the H-1B visa program is
characterized by long waiting times, random selection, and increasingly
high rejection rates, 6 6 the CTFW program offers a faster and more

accommodating process for foreign workers. Specifically, the Global Talent
Stream program (which exists within the larger CTFW program) expedites

work permits for specified high-skill occupations, as well as any other
positions at participating companies requiring "unique and specialized
talent."1 67 As part of the government's broader Global Skills Strategy,
Global Talent Stream work permits can be granted in less than two

weeks. 68 In our background interviews, multiple practitioners stated

1"

"Optional Practical Training for F-1 Students" (last modified 29 February 2021),
online: US Citizenship and Immigration Services <uscis.gov/working-in-the-unitedstates/students-and-exchange-visitors/optional-practical-training-opt-for-f-

1

1-students>.

OPT holders receive a 60-day grace period, but their H-1B application must be

approved by the end of that period.
166

H-1B rejection rates, as low as five percent in 2012, have risen to thirty percent under
the Trump administration. See Niall McCarthy, "H-1B Visa Denials Have Been Rising
Steadily

Under

Trump"

(23

June

2020),

online:

Forbes

<forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2020/06/23/h-1 b-visa-denials-have-been-risingsteadily-under-trump-infographic/>.
167 "Program Requirements for the Global Talent Stream" (last modified 27 May 2021),
online:

Government

of

Canada

<canada.ca/en/employment-social-

development/services/foreign-workers/global-talent/requirements

.html>. To participate in the program, companies must be referred by one of several
designated referral partners, most of which are economic and technological
development organizations.
168

"Priority Processing (14 days) of Work Permits Under the Global Skills Strategy" (last

modified 16 September 2019), online: Immigration,Refugees and Citizenship Canada
<canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/
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Canada's robust foreign worker policies provide an important advantage to
Canadian firms, allowing them to easily source specialized employees from
around the world. Many US tech companies, including Amazon, Google,

and Facebook, have opened or expanded Canadian offices to take
advantage of these policies.1 69

Many of Canada's advantages in attracting and retaining immigrants are

related to political developments in the United States. The Trump
administration has reduced immigration through substantive policy
changes as well as nativist political rhetoric that has deterred potential
immigrants. Prior to COVID-19, legal immigration had decreased by more
than 11% during the Trump administration due to stricter intake policies
and fewer applications.1 70 As US immigration decreased, Canadian

immigration increased,171 signifying the United States' loss in standing as an
immigration destination.1 72 Globally, international migration has decreased

corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/tempora
ry-residents/foreign-workers/two-week-processing.html>.
16

See e.g. Bryan Borzykowski, "Nixing Silicon Valley, US Companies are now Tapping

Canada

for

Tech

Talent",

CNBC

(17

August

2019),

online:

<cnbc.com/2019/08/ 17/nixing-silicon-valley-us-companies-now-tapping

-canada-for-tech-talent.html>; Rani Molla, "Canada is Becoming a Tech Hub. Thanks,
Donald

Trump!"

(19

March

2019),

online:

Vox

/3/19/18264391/us-tech-jobs-canada-immigration-policies-trump>;

<vox.com/2019
Joel

Rose,

"Canada Wins, U.S. Loses in Global Fight for High-Tech Workers" (27January 2020),
online: NPR <npr.org/2020/01/27/799402801/canada-wins-u-s-loses-in-global-fightfor-high-tech-workers>. Each of Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft have large offices in
Vancouver.
170

See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, 'As Trump Barricades the Border, Legal Immigration is
Starting

to

Plunge",

The

New

York

Times

(24

February

2020),

online:

<nytimes.com/2020/02/24/us/politics/trump-border-legal-immi
gration.html>.
171

See Stuart Anderson, "Immigrants Flock to Canada, While U.S. Declines" (18 February
2020),

online:

Forbes

<forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/

02/18/immigrants-flock-to-canada-while-us-declines/>.
172

Emigrants from Hong Kong, for example, now prefer immigration to Canada and
Australia over the United States. See Shawna Kwan, Ben Steverman & Natalie Wong,

"As Wealthy Flee Hong Kong, They Bypass U.S. to Find Other Havens", BNN
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dramatically due to COVID-19, while Joe Biden has replaced Donald
Trump as President of the United States. Whether US immigration will
return to historical levels during the Biden administration remains to be
seen.
As governments around the world have recognized, immigration is an

important factor for economic growth. For decades, the United States has
attracted the best and the brightest immigrants, many of whom have
contributed to American technological dominance. 73 Canada has
historically attracted fewer immigrant entrepreneurs, but this is largely due
to the economic factors discussed in Part IV below, not to barriers imposed
by immigration law. Indeed, as we have argued, Canadian immigration
policy is more favorable than that of the United States. In the years to come,
we expect the Canadian immigration system-characterized
simultaneously by generosity and selectivity-will be a significant
advantage for the Vancouver startup environment.
G.

TRADEPOLICY

Although trade agreements transcend domestic law, 174 the importance of
Canada's trade relationships merits specific attention. Briefly stated,
Canada's trade policies-particularly its free trade relationship with the
United States and Mexico-are a major economic advantage for Canadian
technology companies, allowing them privileged access to the world's
wealthiest free trade area. Under the recent Canada-United States-Mexico
Agreement (CUSMA, or "new NAFTA"), Canadian startups enjoy tarifffree access to a market of nearly 500 million people, an advantage

heightened by Canada's geographic proximity and transportation links to
the United States. The US is far and away Canada's largest export market,

with Canada exporting $318.8 billion in goods and $35.9 billion in services
to the United States in 2018 (representing increases from pre-NAFTA

Bloomberg (8 October 2019), online: Bloomberg <bnnbloomberg.ca/as-wealthy-flee-

hong-kong-they-bypass-u-s-to-find-other-havens-1.1328417>.
13 See AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley's New ImmigrantEntrepreneurs (San Francisco:

Public Policy Institute of California, 1999) at 9-26.
*

Canadian trade agreements are, of course, ratified as acts of Parliament.
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levels of 187% and 294%, respectively).1 7 5 Canadian technology companies
are major beneficiaries of this relationship-more than half of Canadian
tech firms earn more than 40% of their revenues from the United States.1 76
Certain commentators have criticized

CUSMA for weakening

protections for particular industries (particularly agriculture).1 77 The

reality, however, is that the agreement leaves most of NAFTA unchanged.
Many of the amendments to NAFTA are sensible modernizations that
stand to benefit Canadian tech companies. These amendments include the
prohibition of discriminatory duties on electronic goods and services17 8 and

restrictions on imposing platform liability on social media companies and
other internet service providers.1 79 Protections against platform liability
under US law are often cited as an important factor in the success of US
internet companies."' Extending these protections to Canada may have a

'

positive effect on Canadian internet firms.' 8

175

See "Canada, online: Office of the United States Trade Representative <ustr.gov/
countries-regions/americas/canada>.

176

See Stefanie Marotta, "Tech Stocks are Killing it in Canada-and not Just Shopify,
BNNBloomberg (27June 2018), online: <bnnbloomberg.ca/tech-stocks-are-killing-it-

in-canada-and-not-just-shopify-1.1099404>.
177

178

See e.g. "USMCA Costs Canada Sovereignty in Ag Policy, Critics Warn" (30 November
2018), online: AGCanada <agcanada.com/daily/usmca-costs-canada-sovereignty-in-agpolicy-critics-warn> (for an example of this criticism).
See CUSMA, c 19.
See CUSMA, art 19.17. In the United States, protections against intermediary platform

`

liability exist which protect online service providers from civil liability for third-party
content shared or published using their services. See Communications Decency Act, §

230(c)(1). Although there is little effort in Canada to enact similar legislation, CUSMA
prohibits laws specifically imposing platform liability.
0 See e.g. Chander Anupam, "How Law Made Silicon Valley" (2014)63:3 Emory LJ 639
at 650-57.
1I

These changes to NAFTA/CUSMA were strongly supported by the Information
Technology Association of Canada. See Janet Gibson-Eichner, "National Tech Industry
Association Supports CUSMA Agreement" (16 December 2019), online: Information
Technology Association of Canada <itac.ca/blog/national-tech-industry-association-

supports-cusma-agreement/>.
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Although the United States is Canada's largest export market, Canadian
access to other global markets is nearly as important. Canada is one of the
world's leading trading nations, and is a party to several multilateral and
bilateral free trade agreements. Notably, Canada is a party to the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the European
Union, as well as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific

Partnership with six Pacific countries, includingJapan.182 The political logic
of these trade agreements (and their popularity with Canadian voters) is
grounded in Canada's unique status as a large commodity exporter with a
small domestic market. And while Canada's trade-friendly politics have
historically been based on commodities, the higher tech sectors of the
Canadian economy have been collateral beneficiaries. Iflawmakers wish to
maximize these benefits, they should continue to expand Canada's
relationships with additional trading partners.
H.

SUMMARY

Each of these areas of law-tax, securities, corporate, labour, bankruptcy,
immigration, and trade-have important implications for entrepreneurship.
They are not the only legal areas relevant to entrepreneurship, however.
Other areas of law are equally important but feature even fewer differences
between Canada and United States. One example is intellectual property:
Although patenting innovations is crucial for many tech companies, patent
law is essentially the same for Canadian and US firms. This is not because
the law itself is identical in the two countries,1 8 3 but rather because

182

Four additional countries have signed, but not yet ratified, the Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. Canada also has bilateral free trade agreements
with Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Panama, Peru, South
Korea, and Ukraine. See "Trade and Investment Agreements" (last modified 19 July
2021), online: Government of Canada <international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-

agreements-accord
s-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx?lang=eng>.
18

For a memorandum on the similarities and differences between US and Canadian IP
law, see Bob Sotiriadis, "Differences Between U.S. and Canadian Law Regarding
Intellectual

Property"

(1

January 2006),

online

content/uploads/2017/05/345E-BHS-2006.pdf>.

(pdf): Robic

<robic.ca/wp-
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Canadian firms opt into the US patent system by filing US patents. Given
the significance of the US market and the effectiveness of US patent
enforcement, Canadian firms often prioritize US patent registration, with
Canadian registration being a secondary priority.14
Beyond legal issues, the broader policy context is also important to
startup companies.

For example, Vancouver's high cost of living-

exacerbated by low salaries' 85-makes it difficult for companies to recruit
talent.' 86 This affordability issue is influenced by Vancouver's zoning
policies, which have historically favored single-family homes. 8 7 Looking
further afield, even Canadian healthcare policy may influence
entrepreneurship: By divorcing access to health insurance from traditional
salaried employment, Canada's publicly funded healthcare system may
reduce the risks of starting a business. 8 All of this is to say that the full

84

In practice, Canadian firms often file through the Patent Cooperation Treaty system
with the intention of securing a US patent. Since the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office is not geared to the global market, "Canadian patents are an afterthought, even
for Canadian innovators.": James Hinton & Peter Cowan, "CanadaNeeds an Innovative
Intellectual Property Strategy", The Globe and Mail (19

May 2017), online:

<theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/canada-needs-aninnovative-intellectual-property-strategy/article35065156/#:-:text=By%20
announcing%20a%20national%20intellectual,in%20a%2021st%2Dcentury%20econo
my>.
185

See Tyler Orton, "Vancouver Salaries Trail All but One Tech Hub in North America"

(16 July 2020), online: Business in Vancouver <biv.com/article/2020/07/vancouversalaries-trail-all-one-tech-hub-north-america-cbre>.
18

See Peter Mitham, "Housing Costs too High to Attract Tech Talent: Study" Business in
Vancouver (5 December 2018).

187 As in many cities, efforts to de-zone Vancouver and increase housing flexibility have
faced considerable political opposition from incumbent homeowners. A modest pilot
program to increase housing density was recently defeated by city council. See Kenneth
Chan, "Vancouver Mayor's Housing Ownership Affordability Plan Hamstrung by City

Council" (30 September 2020), online: Daily Hive <dailyhive.com/vancouver/makinghome-vancouver-rejected-kennedy-stewart>.
For examples of this argument in the American context, see Raj Aggarwal, Krisztina
Holly & Vivek Wadhwa, "Health Insurance Availability and Entrepreneurship" (2013)
18:4J Developmental Entrepreneurship 1350025-1; Robert W Fairlie, Susan Gates

&

88

Kanika Kapur, "Is Employer-Based Health Insurance a Barrier to Entrepreneurship?"

UBC LAW REVIEW

748

VOL 54:3

effects of social policy on entrepreneurship are complex, such that it is
unlikely any single area of law has a decisive economic impact.
Our discussion in this Part III illustrates this very point. Although many
areas of law influence entrepreneurship, they cannot explain-either
independently or in combination-the empirical outcomes discussed in

Part II. In other words, we find no legal disadvantage facing Canadian
firms. Although bankruptcy and labour law are more favorable in the

United States, this is balanced by Canada's favorable business taxation,
securities regulations, and immigration policy. To be clear, our conclusion is

not that Canadian business law is ideal in any abstract sense or superior to
that of the United States, but simply that it does not impose systematic
disadvantages. Vancouver's weaker entrepreneurial performance compared
to leading US cities must be explained by broader economic factors. It is to
these factors-including their origins, consequences, and potential policy
responses-that this article now turns.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
As discussed, the legal environment in British Columbia is not an
impediment to startup companies. Nevertheless, Vancouver trails not only
Silicon Valley but a number of US regions in terms of business formation,
venture capital investment, and technological innovation. If law is not the
cause of these disparities, what is? Based on our research, we offer three
(related) explanations: (1) absence of scale, (2) lack of venture capital, and
(3) brain drain to the United States. We discuss each of these explanations
in turn.
A.

ABSENCE OF SCALE

By "absence of scale", we mean the absence of a dense, interconnected
network of entrepreneurial firms. This problem is one of "scale" in that even
though individual tech companies have succeeded in Vancouver, they have
(2011) 30:1 J Health Econ 146; Noah Smith, "National Health Insurance Might Be
Good

for

Capitalism"

(23

September

2019),

online:

Bloomberg

<bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-23/employer-based-health-insuranceholds-back-u-s-economy>.
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not developed the shared infrastructure that characterizes larger tech hubs.
As many scholars have argued, successful entrepreneurial regions share a
common developmental model: Typically, as high-tech firms begin to
cluster in a given region (often due to contingent historical factors), they
share with each other common resources, including customers, suppliers,

financing, skilled labour, and-most importantly-ideas. Over time, these
shared resources create economies of scale for the region as a whole,
providing local firms a distinct advantage over geographically distant
competitors. The more successful this "agglomeration" process becomes,
the more it attracts additional firms, creating a virtuous cycle of regional
economic development (and making it increasingly difficult for "follower"
regions to compete)."' This process of agglomeration is exemplified by
Silicon Valley, which emerged from humble beginnings to become a
dominant technological center.'
'r

The concept of agglomeration economies was first developed in the seminal work of
Alfred Marshall. See generally Alfred Marshall, Industry and Trade (London:
Macmillan, 1919).

190

See e.g. Michel Ferrary & Mark Granovetter, "The Role of Venture Capital Firms in
Silicon Valley's Complex Innovation Network" (2009) 38:2 Econ & Soc'y 326 at 33739; Martin Kenney & Urs von Burg, "Technology, Entrepreneurship, and Path

Dependence: Industrial Clustering in Silicon Valley and Route 128" (1999) 8:1 Ind
Corp Change 67; Martin Kenney & Urs von Burg, "Institutions and Economies:
Creating Silicon Valley" in Martin Kenney, ed, UnderstandingSilicon Valley: The

Anatomy

of an EntrepreneurialRegion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000);

Martin Kenney, Explainingthe Growth and GlobalizationofSilicon Valley: The Pastand
Today (Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 2017); Michael E Porter,
"Competitive Advantage, Agglomeration Economies, and Regional Policy" (1996) 19
Int'l Regional Sci Rev 85 at 85-88; Michael E Porter, "Clusters and the New Economics
of Competition" HarvardBusiness Review (1 November 1998) 77; Michael E Porter,
&

"Location, Clusters, and Company Strategy" in Gordon Clark, Maryann Feldman

Meric Gertler, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000); Michael E Porter, "Location, Competition, and Economic
Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy" (2000)

14:1 Economic

Development Quarterly 15 at 21-25; Saxenian, supra note 124; AnnaLee Saxenian,
"The Origins and Dynamics of Production Networks in Silicon Valley" (1991) 20:5
Research Pol'y 423; Timothy Sturgeon, "What Really Goes on in Silicon Valley? Spatial
Clustering and Dispersal in Modular Production Networks" (2003) 3:2

Geography 199 at 217-20.

J
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Insufficient scale can be a major regional disadvantage. Given its
geographic location, Vancouver competes with US cities such as Seattle,
Portland, and San Francisco for skilled labour and investment capital.
Attracting these inputs is difficult without a dense network of local tech
companies. Unfortunately, the local market is limited by the size of the

Canadian economy, which is less than one-tenth the size of that of the
United States. A larger national economy would support more and larger
startup companies, which would in turn lead to greater opportunities for
workers and entrepreneurs. Starting from behind-both historically and
economically-makes it difficult to achieve momentum.
This lack of scale at the regional level is mirrored within individual
firms. Although Vancouver produces a significant number of startups, few
of them scale into large, sustainable businesses. This "scale up" problem is
widely acknowledged within the Vancouver startup community and across
Canada.' 9 ' Many Vancouver startups either fail early in their growth cycle
or are taken out in acquisitions by larger US tech companies."' Without a

'91

For discussions of the Canadian scale-up problem, see Benjamin Bergen, "Canada Has a
Scale-up Problem, Not a Start-up Problem" (25 April 2017), online: Centre for
InternationalGovernanceInnovation <cigionline.org/articles/canada-has-scale-problemnot-start-problem/>; Gerry Remers, "Canada's Startup Problem Isn't Lack ofTalent, but

Expertise in Scaling Up" (31 August 2016), online: The Globe and Mail
<theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/canadas-startup-problemisnt-lack-of-talent-but-expertise-in-scaling-up/article31611569/>;
Nick Rockel,
"Q&A: Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and Investor Michael Wee Sizes up B.C's Tech
Ecosystem" (19 May 2020), online: BCBusiness <bcbusiness.ca/QA-Silicon-Valley-

entrepreneur-and-investor-Michael-Wee-sizes-up-BCs-tech-ecosystem>; Scaling Success:
Tackling the Management Gap in Canada's Technology Sector (Waterloo: Lazaridis
Institute, 2016) [Scaling Success]. The Digital Technology Supercluster's strategic plan

specifically addresses this scale-up issue. See Strategic Plan: 2018-2023 (Digital
Technology Supercluster, 2019) at 20, 35.
1

Notwithstanding successful IPOs such as Shopify Inc and Real Matters Inc, many
Canadian startups are acquired prematurely. See Dax Dasilva, "Too Many Canadian
Startups are Bought Out. Here's How to Change That" (6 January 2016), online: The

Globe

and

Mail

<theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary

/too-many-canadian-startups-are-bought-out-heres-how-to-changethat/article28024596/>. Indeed, of the top 10 highest value Canadian exits, 7 have
been acquisitions by foreign companies. See Brian Kobus, "Canadian Tech Exit
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developed ecosystem of successful anchor companies, it is difficult to
generate the externalities that characterize tech hubs such as Silicon Valley.
A specific example of this problem is that while Vancouver has a growing
pool of programmers and engineers, it has relatively few experienced
professionals in areas such as sales, finance, and management-functions

that become increasingly important as companies scale."' Similarly,
Vancouver lacks an established generation of successful entrepreneurs to
mentor younger founders in their transition to profitability.94 According to
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP this lack of mentorship means that "founders
may feel that they don't have the knowledge, experience-or inclinationto run a business for the long haul." 9 5
Unfortunately, this problem of scale has no simple solution.
Government cannot simply create successful businesses, nor can it
legislatively increase the size of the Canadian economy. Certain policy
measures may ameliorate the situation, however. The federal Innovation
Superclusters Initiative is a promising example.

96

The Vancouver-based

Digital Technology Supercluster-one of five supercluster projects across

Leaderboard" (1 June 2018), online: Noteworthy <blog.usejournal.com/canadian-tech-

exit-leaderboard-f4efl37 4 a5ae>. Nearly two-thirds of Canadian founders see
acquisition by another company as their most likely exit strategy. See "A Nation of
Innovators: 2015 Canadian Emerging Technology Companies' Survey" (2015) at 20,

online

(pdf):

PricewaterhouseCoopers

LLP

<pwc.com/ca/en/emerging-

company/connecting-vision-to-reality/publications/pwc-ceo-report-emerging-

companies-2015-06-en.pdf> [A Nation ofInnovators].
93

See Rockel, supra note 191; supra note 34 at 5, 7, 24; supra note 191 at 11-15,

19-25.
194

See Glen Edwards, "Startup Fever: B.C. Becomes Hot Spot for Entrepreneurs" (3 April
2018), online: Business in Vancouver <biv.com/article/2018/04/startup-fever-bcbecomes-hot-spot-entrepreneurs>; Rockel, supra note 191; Scaling Success, supra note
191 at 13-14. Startup Genome's latest Global Startup Ecosystem Report rates

Vancouver low on "local connectedness," which includes local community, relationships,
and collisions between founders, investors, and experts: Global Startup Ecosystem
Report, supra note 2 at 27, 40.
195

A Nation oflnnovators, supra note 192 at 20.

196

See "Digital Technology Supercluster" supra note 3.
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Canada-seeks to build a regional network of high-tech research and
development infrastructure, exactly what Vancouver lacks.19 7 Beyond this
targeted support, the best steps that government can take to foster
increasing scale are to (1) continue to ensure a business-friendly legal
environment and (2) encourage integration with the US economy. Each of

these recommendations are discussed in our Conclusion.
B.

LACK OF DOMESTIC VENTURE CAPITAL

In addition to scaling challenges, Vancouver also lacks sufficient venture
capital. The local venture capital industry is incapable of meeting local
demand. Startup Genome-a startup data and ranking firm-awards
Vancouver a dismal "1 out of 10" for funding availability.198 Given the small
size of the market, local venture capital financing is often provided on
unfavorable terms (compared to the United States) and, beyond a certain
investment size, is simply not available at all."' The consequence is that
most venture capital invested in Vancouver comes from outside British
Columbia, particularly from the United States. The deep network of
venture capital firms in Silicon Valley-and the massive amounts of
investment capital they can attract from institutional investors-are simply
not present in western Canada. Once Vancouver startups grow beyond a
certain size, they are forced to look beyond Canada for funding."'
This lack of local venture capital poses several disadvantages. First,
venture capitalists prefer to invest in geographically local companies. Other
197 Each of the five supercluster projects is jointly financed by private industry and the
federal government. See Strategic Plan: 2018-2023, supra note 191 (for a full

description of the Digital Technology Supercluster and its financing and operations).
'"1

GlobalStartup Ecosystem Report, supra note 2 at 27.

"9

For Vancouver-based venture capital firms, the median early stage investment size (series
A or series B) is approximately $5.7 million, while the median late stage investment size
(series C or later) is $20 million. This compares to $10.5 million and $30 million in

Silicon Valley, respectively. Authors' calculations based on Crunchbase data.
2oo Since Canadian venture capital firms are smaller than their US counterparts, they are
less capable of making the larger investments associated with later stage funding rounds.
See Canada'sVenture CapitalLandscape:Challenges and Opportunities(BDC Capital,
2017) at 12-16.
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things being equal, venture capital firms are less likely to invest in startups
outside their home region. This can make it difficult for Vancouver startups
to attract capital. Second, a major benefit of receiving venture capital is
hands-on involvement on the part of venture capital investors in the
strategy and management of the company. Startups receiving venture

'

capital from geographically distant investors may receive less in the way of
guidance, monitoring, and regular face-to-face interactions. Finally, if
Vancouver startups are funded by firms based in Silicon Valley, they may
eventually relocate to California.2
Vancouver's lack of venture capital is partially offset by public financing.
As discussed in Part II, Vancouver startups undergo IPOs at an unusually

high rate-more than 20 times that of Silicon Valley. These IPOs, which
typically occur on junior markets such as the TSX-V and the Canadian
Stock Exchange, are much different from the high-value IPOs of the
United States. Whereas US startups often go public after having achieved
scale, Vancouver startups tend to go public very early in their life cycle, as a
means of raising early growth capital. Many Canadian startups undergo
IPOs at the same stage at which US companies raise Series A financing.
This pattern of early, speculative IPOs may be related to the Canadian

tradition ofjunior market financing-traceable to the mining industry and
the "wild west" days of the Vancouver Stock Exchange202-as well as a lack

of private investment. Given the lack of alternative financing, Vancouver
startups use IPOs as a substitute for venture capital.

23

Unfortunately, IPOs are an inferior substitute. In addition to financing,
venture capitalists provide value in the form of experience, mentoring, and
networking opportunities. As repeat players, venture capitalists can guide
inexperienced founders through the development of their companies and
eventual liquidity. Association with a reputable venture capital firm alone

201 This phenomenon is discussed in Part IV(C), below.
202

Indeed, junior mining companies continue to represent a significant portion of
Vancouver IPOs.

203

See Ari Pandes & Michael

J

Robinson, "The Canadian Junior IPO Market and the

Capital Pool Company Program" in Mario Levis & Silvio Vismara, eds, Handbook of

Research on IPOs (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 124.
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can enhance a startup's profile and likelihood of success. Anonymous public
financing-especially on junior markets-provides none of these benefits.
Investors on the TSX-V, Canadian Stock Exchange, and other junior
markets are often retail speculators or specialized high-risk investors. They
rarely have any long-term interest in the business and provide nothing in

the way of strategy or monitoring.
Another disadvantage of public financing is high transaction costs.
Given economies of scale, underwriting expenses for small public offerings
are often higher-as a percentage of total proceeds-than for larger public
offerings. In a comparative study of US and Canadian securities offerings,

Maher Cooli and Jean-Marc Suret found that while transaction costs are
not higher in Canada overall, underwriting expenses are significantly higher
for smaller IPOs in both countries. 2 4 Once firms go public, moreover, they
face continuing regulatory costs in the form of compliance and disclosure
requirements. These costs can put serious financial pressure on smaller
companies with limited revenue. Unfortunately, once a firm goes public, it
becomes very difficult to go back. Founders often experience significant
dilution in an IPO and find themselves beholden to uncooperative
shareholders. Absent the intervention of a third-party acquirer, buying back
the company's shares is practically impossible, leaving the company trapped
under burdensome public securities regulations. In light of these
disadvantages, Vancouver firms would benefit from greater access to private
capital.
As with absence of scale, the ability ofgovernment to solve this problem
is limited. Government intervention in venture capital markets has a poor
track record, both in Canada and elsewhere. Research has found that

subsidized venture capital programs produce suboptimal returns and low
levels of innovation, and may even crowd out higher quality private

capital.0 5 If government does choose to finance venture capital, however,
254

Maher Kooli & Jean-Marc Suret, How Cost-Effective are Canadian IPO Markets?,
(Montral: Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des Organisations, 2002).

205

For Canadian evidence, see e.g. James A Brander, Edward Egan & Thomas F Hellmann,
"Government Sponsored Versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence" in Josh

Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, eds, International Differences in Entrepreneurship
(University of Chicago Press, 2010) 275 at 315-18; Massimo G Colombo, Douglas J
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the empirical evidence suggests that private market involvement-either
though granting investment decisions to independent investment managers
or securing co-investments from private investors-can help ensure
economic discipline. The recently launched BC Tech Fund-a $100
million publicly funded, privately managed fund of funds-may be an

example of an effectively designed program, though the results of the fund
remain to be seen. 206 Even if the BC Tech Fund is successful, however, $100
million is probably not enough to fundamentally improve BC's capital
environment. The BC government has recently announced a larger $500

million "InBC" fund, though details regarding its operations have yet to be
announced.2 0 7 In the longer term, the most important task of government is
ensuring an attractive investment environment. If economic and legal
conditions are sufficiently favorable, private capital will arrive.

Cumming & Silvio Vismara, "Governmental Venture Capital for Innovative Young
Firms" (2014) 41:1

J Tech

Transfer 10 at 14-16; Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note

79; Cumming, Johan & MacIntosh, supra note 79. In China, massive government

investment in venture capital led to a wave of costly business failures in 2019. See Ryan
McMorrow, "China Tech Startups Go Bust in 2019 'Capital Winter"' (6January 2020),

online:

The

Financial

Times

<ft.com/content/

b74394c8-2d57-11ca-al 26-99756bd8f45e>.
206

Perhaps inauspiciously, one of BC Tech Fund's first major portfolio companies, Mojio,
relocated to Silicon Valley shorty following the fund's investment. See Tyler Orton, "BC
Tech Fund's First Investment Goes South" (27 February 2019), online: Business in

Vancouver <biv.com/article/2019/02/bc-tech-funds-first-investment-goes-south>.
207

See "InBC Investment Corp.", online: InBC Investment Corp <inbcinvestment.ca/>.
The limited information currently available does not necessarily inspire confidence. The
fund's webpage highlights its "triple bottom line" approach to achieving "the values and

needs of British Columbians;' which may be code for pursuing the current government's
political objectives. Making investment decisions based on political criteria heightens
the risk of allocating public funds to suboptimal companies. To ensure proper financial
discipline, it will be important for the fund's investments to be controlled by an
independent investment manager or leverage private co-investors.
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BRAIN DRAIN

The third issue facing Vancouver (and Canada more broadly) is brain drain
to the United States. 20 Because this issue is primarily driven by the size of
the US economy, it is perhaps the issue Canadian policy makers are least
able to control. The problem of brain drain is pervasive across Canada,

affecting all major cities and all aspects of the tech economy, including
skilled workers, entrepreneurs, and even entire companies.
Brain drain is an unavoidable result of the strength of the US tech
industry. For a variety of economic reasons, tech salaries in the United
States are substantially higher than in Canada. American tech firms recruit
heavily from Canadian universities, offering higher salaries and more
prestigious experiences than their Canadian counterparts. Consequently,

succeeding in Silicon Valley is a major career ambition for Canadian
engineering students.2 " Not even faculty are immune-several of Canada's
leading researchers in artificial intelligence and robotics have left their
university positions to work for US tech companies.210 Notwithstanding
the benefits of CUSMA, 211 Canada's free trade arrangement with the
United States may exacerbate brain drain, as it provides Canadians
privileged access to the US labour market.2 1 2 Mobility of labour is felt
particularly acutely in BC-when tech salaries in Seattle are double those in

208 See Goodman, Olmstead & Spicer, supra note 37 at 24 (for discussion of the sever
nature of the brain drain problem in information-technology fields). An astonishingly
high 66% of Canadian software engineering graduates leave Canada to work in other
countries. See ibid.
209

See e.g. ibid at 26-28.

210 Although Canada has been a world leader in artificial intelligence research, many

Canadian professors, researchers, and graduate students have been lured to privatesector opportunities in the United States. See Jack Clark & Gerrit de Vynck, "Canada
Risks Losing its Lead in Artificial Intelligence to Silicon Valley" (17 December 2015),

online: The Globe and Mail <theglobeandmail.com/technology/tech-news/canadarisks-losing-its-lead-in-artificial-intelligence-to-silicon-valley/article27810747/>. In the
last decade, the UBC computer science department has lost at least six full-time faculty
members to US-based tech companies.
211 Discussed in Part III(G),
212 See CUSMA, c 1 6 , s D.

above.
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Vancouver, moving south is a tempting proposition for many engineering

graduates.
This brain drain is a major economic loss for Canada. Not only do
Canadian employers lose access to skilled workers, but some of these
workers go on to start companies in the United States. As discussed in Part
II, many Canadian graduates form startups in the US, either directly

following graduation or after working for a US tech firm. Roughly a quarter
of all UBC, University of Toronto, and University of Waterloo alumni who
start companies do so in the United States. Moreover, given the

competitiveness of the US market and the personal characteristics of many
immigrants (ambition, risk tolerance, etc.), expatriate Canadians may be
positively selected, such that the most promising entrepreneurs are the most
likely to leave Canada. This loss of talent is partially offset by Canadian
immigration, but stemming the flow of out-migration would clearly be in
Canada's interests.
The most extreme example of brain drain is the relocation of entire
businesses. This occasionally occurs when startups are either purchased by
US tech firms or receive significant US financing.213 Canadian startups are
often purchased by foreign buyers-of 164 acquisitions of Canadian
technology companies between 2004 and 2012, in only a single transaction
was the buyer a Canadian company.21" Firms that relocate to the United
States often maintain a Canadian presence, but even the migration of a
company's management-and the resulting shift in personal networksrepresents a loss to the Canadian economy. A notable example is Slack
Technologies, Inc, which was founded in Vancouver in 2009 and relocated
to Silicon Valley following investments by US venture capital firms. Since

relocating to the United States, Slack has become a Silicon Valley success
story, going public in 2019 at a valuation of more than $20 billion.

213

Acquisition by a US tech firm is often the explicit exit strategy for Canadian
entrepreneurs.

2

See The Issue: Building Stronger Tech Companiesin Canada (Information Technology
Association of Canada, 2013) at 5-8.
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Although Slack maintains a significant Vancouver office, its center of
gravity has shifted to the United States. 15
Obviously, there is little that government can do to prevent individuals
from leaving Canada. More entrepreneurs might stay if Canada had a
stronger venture capital industry, but again, creating such an industry is

beyond the powers of federal or provincial government. Fortunately, given
the high quality of Canadian startups and the favorable regulatory
environment, it has become increasingly possible for Canadian firms to
successfully attract US capital," and there is growing evidence that more of
these firms are choosing to remain in Canada. 1 7 At the same time, many
US tech firms are entering the Canadian market, training, and employing
thousands of Canadian workers. 218 Again, as long as government maintains
a welcoming regulatory environment, the networks to support large-scale
businesses will organically emerge.

CONCLUSION

V.

To return to the question posed at the outset of this article: To what extent
is Vancouver a successful innovation hub? The answer depends on one's

frame of reference. On the one hand, Vancouver performs well compared to
other Canadian cities, leading the country in number of startups and

215

Slack was recently acquired by Salesforce.com, Inc, a US customer relationship
management company. Ron Miller & Alex Wilhelm, "Salesforce Buys Slack in a $27.7B
Megadeal"
(1
December
2020),
online:
TechCrunch
<social
.techcrunch.com/2020/12/01/salesforce-buys-slack/>.

216 According to our calculations, during the period of 2010 to 2019, US venture capital
investment in Canada increased as much as 1,400%.
21-

In Vancouver, successful startups such as Clio, Bench, Hootsuite, Trulioo, and Visier
have received major US investments but remained headquartered in Canada.

218 Each of Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft have large and expanding offices in
Vancouver. Even in the midst of COVID-19, Amazon is increasing its presence by

opening a new branch office in the city, one of the company's largest. It is poised to
become Vancouver's largest corporate leaseholder, potentially adding thousands ofhighpaying engineering and management jobs. See "Amazon Poised to be Largest Corporate
Office

Tenant in Downtown

Vancouver" (23 June 2020),

<urbanyvr.com/amazon-vancouver-offices/>.

online:
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venture capital invested per capita.219 On the other hand, Vancouver's
record is less impressive than many cities in the United States. Even putting
aside Silicon Valley, Vancouver produces fewer startups, receives less
investment, and generates fewer patents than most US tech hubs.
This article has argued Vancouver's performance is not the result oflegal

factors. Indeed, across a range of specific legal areas-tax, securities,
corporate law, labour, bankruptcy, immigration, and trade-the legal
environment in British Columbia is at least as favorable as California.2 0
Although certain areas could be improved, Vancouver's primary challenges
are not legal in nature. This is an important finding in and of itself, as law
can potentially have a major impact on entrepreneurship.'
Rather than legal obstacles, Vancouver's primary challenges are
economic. The city's startup environment has shown impressive growth but
continues to lack a critical mass of companies operating at scale. This
illustrates the chicken-or-egg dilemma of agglomeration development: Lack
of venture capital has prevented exponentially successful companies, which
has in turn prevented the equity returns which attract and fuel venture

capital.2

Given these constraints, many potential entrepreneurs have

relocated to the United States, taking their economic contributions with
them.
Given these challenges, what can policy makers do? As British

Columbia's legal environment is already favorable, we do not recommend
major reforms. Two policy areas could be modified to encourage startup

activity, however. First, lawmakers should consider bankruptcy reforms to
reduce the risks faced by individual debtors. A promising step would be to

increase provincial bankruptcy exemptions, allowing debtors to keep a
greater portion of the value of their homes. This would reduce the risk of
21

Although not discussed in this article, Vancouver also performs favorably compared to
Asian and European cities.

220

Note, however, that California is by no means a particularly business-friendly
jurisdiction.

12

Douglas

J

Cumming, Daniel Schmidt & Uwe Walz, "Legality and Venture Capital

Governance Around the World" (2010) 25:1
222

J

Bus Venturing 54 at 71.

In Silicon Valley, many prominent investors were themselves successful entrepreneurs.
Large equity returns thus fuel additional equity investment.
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starting a business and free up capital for new ventures. Second, we
recommend that all levels of government (including local and municipal
authorities) pursue legal reforms to reduce Vancouver's housing costs, which

are a significant obstacle to attracting skilled workers and entrepreneurs.
Although regional and municipal governments have attempted various tax

and subsidy schemes to increase housing affordability, the results to date
have been mixed. A more promising approach would be to thoroughly
reform Vancouver's urban zoning restrictions, which strongly favor
detached homes and inhibit urban density.
Beyond these reforms, existing policy programs such as the Innovation
Superclusters Initiative, the BC Tech Fund, and the various existing tax

incentives for entrepreneurship likely exhaust the range of effective
government intervention. In the longer term, the best way for Vancouver to
develop as an innovation hub may be to increase its integration with the
United States, a process driven by private actors rather than government
policy. Fortunately, this process is already underway. The infusion of US
venture capital and growing presence of US tech companies are both
positive developments for the Vancouver economy. The jobs created by
these investments will contribute to the agglomeration networks which
have proven so important in larger tech regions. The more developers,
engineers, and business professionals in Vancouver, the stronger the
environment for emerging startup companies.
For this reason, local, provincial, and federal policy makers should
welcome foreign investment, particularly from the United States.223 In the
immediate term, investment by foreign tech companies and the expansion
of local firms remains complicated by COVID-19, which-in addition to

its human costs-presents both challenges and opportunities from a

223 Another source of potential investment capital is China. Worsening diplomatic relations

between China and Canada may be permanently damaging the two countries' economic
ties, however. Chinese investment in Canada has declined in the context of antiCanadian rhetoric by Chinese diplomatic officials and increased Canadian scrutiny of
Chinese acquisitions in Canada. See Jesse Snyder, "As Geopolitical Tensions Rise,

Chinese Investment into Canada Continues to Fall, Data Show" (15July 2020), online:
National
Post
<nationalpost.com/news/as-geopolitical-tensions-rise-chineseinvestment-into-canada-continues-to-fall-data-show>
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business and employment perspective. As the pandemic drags on, the rise of
remote work policies and the decentralization of labour has reduced the
importance for tech companies of maintaining anchor offices in large cities.
Different companies are responding to the changed environment in
different ways-as of this writing, Shopify's plans for expanding its

Vancouver office are in doubt, whereas Amazon is continuing to build a
large Vancouver anchor office.224 It is even possible remote work policies
may increase hiring in Vancouver, which shares the same time zone as San
Francisco and Seattle but has much lower salaries. While the long-term
effects of COVID-19 are difficult to predict, they may entail convergence
in hiring and salaries across cities, a trend that could benefit Vancouver.
Brain drain will remain an issue, however, and further integration with
the United States could exacerbate the problem. This is particularly true
given the election of President Biden and the end of the Trump
administration, which had served as a hostile deterrent to US immigration.
Among Canadian STEM graduates, a major reservation about working in
the United States has been "the American political climate and approach to

social policy."2 If this climate improves under President Biden, Canadian
graduates might become even more likely to relocate. Despite Canada's

many attractions-including low crime, tolerant politics, and competent
government administration-tech professionals are primarily motivated by
economic opportunity, which is simply greater in the United States. As this
will remain the case for the foreseeable future, talented Canadians will

continue to be drawn south. Rather than fighting the inevitable, we
recommend that the federal government maintain its liberal immigration

policies, which allow Canada to import talent globally. In time, as the
domestic tech economy develops, Canada will be better positioned to retain
domestic talent.
224

See Kenneth Chan, "It's Official: Amazon Will Employ 6,000 People in Vancouver's
The

Post

Redevelopment"

(28

September

2020),

online:

Daily

Hive

<dailyhive.com/vancouver/anazon-the-post-office-redevelopment-lease>; Tyler Orton,
"Office Rethink Could Retool Vancouver's Tech Status" (29 May 2020), online:

225

Business in Vancouver <biv.com/article/2020/05/office-rethinkcould-retoolvancouvers-tech-status>.
Goodman, Olmstead & Spicer, supra note 37 at 33.
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To conclude, law is not an obstacle to Vancouver's economic growth.
Institutional factors beyond the control of lawmakers play a larger role. The
limited scale of the economy, the lack of domestic venture capital, and the
problem of brain drain all pose challenges to Vancouver's economic
development. Since these problems are largely unrelated to legal policy, the

most realistic goal for lawmakers-at least in the short term-may be to
avoid making things worse.226 Looking to the future, Vancouver startups are
well positioned to strengthen ties with the United States, the world's
leading capital and technology market. This integrative process may
accelerate under the Biden administration, which has turned away from the
antagonisms of the Trump era. We strongly recommend that government-

both federal and provincial-welcome this integration. Efforts to make
Canada economically self-sufficient, or to reduce the role of US investment
in Canadian business development, are unlikely to contribute to Canadian
prosperity. Fortunately, Canada has a strong tradition of openness and
liberalism, which has contributed to the tech economy's already impressive
growth. Given Canada's favorable legal environment, increasing US
investment, and a culture of receptiveness to new people and ideas, there are
many reasons for optimism regarding Vancouver's economic future.

226 Or, to paraphrase President Barack Obama, "don't do stupid [stuff].": Mike Allen,

"'Don't Do Stupid Sh-- (stuff)"' (1 June 2014), online: Politico <politico.com
/story/2014/06/dont-do-stupid-shit-president-obama-white-house-107293>.

